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ABSTRACT
This dissertation concerns the economics of price setting in both the industrial or-
ganization and macroeconomics literature. Across three chapters, I document salient
features of prices and model their behavior. In the first chapter, we reconcile the
potential for collusion in a product market, with frequent large sales, by building
and estimating a model of collusion that allows producers to temporarily be on sale.
In the second chapter, we document new facts about the frequency at the product
level with which regular prices change, firstly that they are more likely to change
the higher the revenue of the product, secondly that given they change they change
by less the higher the revenue of the product. We embed these facts in a menu
cost model, and show their importance to aggregate dynamics. Finally in my third
chapter, we recover firm level markups using a model of final good inventories, that
encompasses dynamic incentives.
In my first chapter, joint with DongIk Kang, we argue that temporary price re-
ductions (or sales) are a result of a strategic interaction between potentially colluding
firms. Rather than interpreting all price reductions as defections, sales are permit-
ted in a tacitly collusive equilibrium, due to the presence of large negative shocks to
marginal cost. Private information over the presence of the shocks imply an incentive
xi
for the producers to mimic the low costs, in equilibrium producers will play a mixed
strategy. We estimate the demand and cost primitives in the retail beer market that
are consistent with our model. We find that sales are a relatively important part
of the producers strategy, as under our model unilateral deviation to no-sales would
reduce profit by 4-6%. Our equilibrium is also compared to an equilibrium where
all firms charge only a regular price and never go on sale, we find that this no-sales
equilibrium is less stable than the sales equilibrium in terms of minimum discount
factor that could support it.
In my second chapter, also joint with DongIk Kang, we shift our attention to the
menu cost literature. Revenue variation across products and time directly affects
price setting decisions and monetary policy transmission. As product revenue rises,
the probability of price adjustment increases while the absolute size of adjustment
decreases. In addition, monetary policy shocks have heterogeneous effects on prices
depending on product revenue: the responsiveness of prices increases with revenue.
We verify these facts empirically, and show that they are consistent with predictions
from a menu cost model in which the menu cost does not increase proportionally
with revenue. We find that this heterogeneity in price responsiveness has important
implications for monetary policy transmission using a calibrated menu cost model.
In my third chapter, joint with Alberto Arredondo Chavez, we use firm-level
data on stocks of final goods and sales in order to estimate the change in firm-level
markups through time. We extend a model of stock-out prevention to accommodate
a variety of price-setting behavior. This allows us to be agnostic about the product
market structure. Everything else equal, a higher markup implies a higher stock to
xii
sales ratio as the loss from a stock-out is larger. Three other components are key
in order to identify markups with our model: the rate at which the firm discounts
future flows, the expected growth in marginal costs and the strength of the need
for inventories to prevent stock-outs. We use our information at the firm level to
measure these components and recover markups.
xiii
CHAPTER I
Temporary Price Reductions and Competition:
Evidence From The Retail Beer Market
1.1 Introduction
Discussion of the possibility of cooperation in pricing between producers dates to
at least Adam Smith. With few competitors, an opportunity arises to raise prices to
benefit each competitor. Such an arrangement is tempered, however, by the incentive
to undercut each other. At the same time, producers experience constant changes in
demand and cost conditions. One strategy producers use to take advantage of these
changes is a temporary price reduction (or sale1). A naive observer would view these
price cuts as evidence that the market was not collusive, however, in this paper we
view the price reductions are a major part of the tacitly collusive strategy. Producers
will not immediately punish each other for sales, instead we model sales as a part of
1Henceforth sales for the sake of brevity. When confusion might arise between revenue and the
other common meaning of sales we will use revenue.
1
the collusive equilibrium. We take this idea to the retail beer industry and estimate
the demand and cost primitives. We find each producer would have their profit
reduced by approximately 1-8% by switching to a comparative no-sale equilibrium.
In addition, we find that the sales equilibrium is more sustainable in terms of the
minimum discount factor that could support it than the no-sale equilibrium.
Sales are a common phenomenon, according to the CPI micro data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (Midrigan Kehoe 2015) 72% of all price changes are tem-
porary, and 50% of all changes revert to their initial regular price. In addition, the
average size of the discount offered is 11%. In another more narrow data-set 35% of
all goods sold were sold on sale.2 We take these facts as evidence that sales are a
phenomenon worthy of more interest. Recent empirical research on collusion assumes
that sales are either exogenous or unimportant to the equilibrium, this paper takes
the opposite view and treats sales as a strategic variable.
Our main results show how temporary price reductions play an important role in
sustaining collusion. The presence of large shocks to marginal cost give producers a
strong incentive to undercut others by setting a lower price. In the equilibrium that
allows sales, producers are allowed to take advantage of these periods. This has two
effects on the ability for firms to sustain collusion, firstly this raises the profitability
of remaining collusive relative to the punishment or single period equilibrium profit.
Secondly, because the prices of the products on sale are closer to the one period
optimal price, the payoff from defection decreases. The higher profit on the collusive
path the more sustainable the collusive equilibrium, all else equal. Additionally, the
2Midrigan and Kehoe (2015), using Dominick’s Finer Foods 1989-1994.
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lower the profit from defection the more sustainable the equilibrium, all else equal.
We confirm this intuition by calculating the minimum discount factor required to
sustain the equilibrium with sales we observe and a no-sale equilibrium where firms
only charge the regular price in each market. Indeed over our sample we find that
the minimum discount factor that could sustain the sales equilibrium is lower than
the no-sales equilibrium.
We focus on the American retail beer industry for the following reasons: it is a
well defined market with standardized products across markets. In addition, there
are a few large producers Anheuser-Busch Inbev (main brands Budweiser and Bud
Light), SABMiller (main brands Miller Genuine Draft and Miller Lite), and Molson
Coors (main brands Coors and Coors Lite) that appear to dominate the market and
have been suspected of tacit collusion. A recent treatment of this industry, Miller
and Weinberg (2017) has illustrated the possibility of collusion intensifying after the
merger between two of the three largest firms, Miller and Coors. We choose to focus
on the temporary price reductions in this industry and their strategic content.
Our work extends three strands of literature, firstly the work on collusion modeled
as the result of a super game. Papers such as Porter (1983) and Bresnahan (1987)
began a literature that explicitly modeled market outcomes as a game between the
participants in the market. Specifically we extend the empirical literature on dynamic
competition. We build on work by Black Crawford Liu and White (2004) and Fan
and Sullivan (2017), adding an additional stage of competition in each period that
allows producers to respond to cost shocks. These models assume that all play
is on equilibrium path, that is the firms never deviate from the collusive outcome
3
during the sample. Instead changes in the competitive outcome come from changes
in the primitives of the game, or the equilibrium that the firms are playing. Several
industries have been examined for example: Sullivan (unpublished) models the choice
of product mix in the premium ice cream market, Igami and Sugayaz (2018) study
the vitamin market, and Miller and Weinberg (2017) in beer. These papers do not
directly observe collusion or the primitives of the supply side and therefore must
make substantive assumptions on the nature of the supply side.
Another literature works somewhat in reverse, starting from legal or regulatory
information that collusion was more than tacit and seeks to examine its result. For
example Clark Houde (2013) and Asker (2010) benefit from legal proceedings actually
used to convict firms of illegal conduct. In more recent work, Eizenberg and Shilian
(2019) study several supermarket categories, building a measure of the degree of
collusion by looking for the minimum discount factor that would support the perfectly
collusive outcome. Miller, Sheu and Weinberg (2019) model the retail beer market as
having a clear market leader sets a price and the other producers decide to accept it,
or defect from it. We offer a model that allows for intermediate amounts of collusion,
that also treats the producers symmetrically.
We are also closely related to the literature that studies temporary price reduc-
tions. Chevalier, Kashyap, Rossi (2003) examine movement of prices in periods
of high demand, and find that higher demand appear correlated with lower prices.
There is also a great deal of discussion of temporary price reductions in the macroeco-
nomics literature, Anderson Malin Nakuruma Simester and Stiensson (2017) present
some institutional details about the nature of producer-retailer contracts that al-
4
low for sales. Particularly of interest to our paper, sales appear to come from a
“sticky plan”. Firms do not necessarily respond local demand and cost conditions,
instead the producers set windows with in which the retailers are supposed to put
the good on sale. This allows retailers limited flexibility. Another important paper
for our context is Midrigan and Kehoe (2015), which in addition to showing that the
non-sale or regular price is fairly sticky or slow to change. In addition, this paper
introduced an algorithm that allows us to determine the regular price and sale price
in the absence of direct recording of this in the data.
Thirdly, we add to the literature that uses mixed strategies to model real world
outcomes. Papers such Azar and Bar Eli (2011) examine the context of soccer penalty
kicks and find that in this high stakes but simple context that mixed strategy Nash
Equilibrium rationalizes players choices better than competing models. Chiappori,
Levitt, and Groseclose (2002) examined the same context and could not reject that
players with heterogeneous skill levels were playing the mixed strategy Nash Equilib-
rium. In the Industrial Organization literature most authors restrict their analysis
to games with pure strategy equilibria. Bajari Hong and Ryan (2010), in contrast,
show in the context of entry games, that allowing for mixed strategies allows for the
identification of the primitives of the payoff function.
The next section details the data we use and show descriptive evidence of the
equilibrium outcomes in the beer market, then we introduce a model of sales be-
havior, following that we estimate the model. Finally, we show our equilibrium is
more profitable and more sustainable than a no-sale equilibrium that does not allow
temporary price reductions over the sample.
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1.2 Data and descriptive evidence
The primary data this paper uses is the Nielsen Retailer Scanner database ob-
tained through the Kilts Marketing Center at the University of Chicago Booth. We
use the data from 32 of the designated market areas (DMAs), these are listed in
Appendix A. We use data from 2007 to 2015, we aggregate weekly data to monthly
to alleviate concerns about measurement error. In addition, this aggregation allevi-
ates concerns that demand may have dynamic considerations, driven by storage by
the consumers. We deflate the prices by the Food and Beverage CPI deflator for all
Urban Consumers.
In the data not all of the sale prices are flagged, therefore we make use the
algorithm introduced by Midrigan and Kehoe (2014) to compute regular prices. In
other work, we used the same procedure on the Nielsen scanner data but with a
larger set of products. The algorithm determines the regular price as the modal
price in an 11-week window surrounding each week provided the modal price is used
sufficiently often.3 If the modal price is not used more than two-thirds of the time in
a given 11 week window than the current price is determined to be the regular price.
We use this as our measure of whether a given good is on sale in a given week in a
given store.
We differ from some of the existing literature in industrial organization by using
such an algorithm. Papers such as Hendel Nevo (2006) have used different definitions
of regular price, such as the maximum or mode in a certain period. We believe the
3A detailed description of the algorithm we use to compute regular prices can be found in the
appendix of Midrigan Kehoe (2013).
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algorithm from Midrigan Kehoe (2014) is more likely to pick up sales rather than
staggered price increases. Additionally the literature varies on the depth of sale to
classify a price as a sale or not. Hendel and Nevo (2006) consider various depths of
sale (1%, 10%, 25%, 50%). We find that the large depths of sale are very infrequent
in our sample, for this reason we use 3%.
Table 1.1 includes the summary statstics of the sample we use for demand esti-
mation. We convert all prices into 12 packs of 12 oz equivalents, by dividing by the
number of onces in the product and multiplying by 144.
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics: Demand Estimation Sample
Monthly Rev. Average Price Regular Price Sale Price % on Sale
Mean 53966 10.99 11.10 10.23 12.55
Median 14744 10.70 10.77 9.73 3.12
Std. Dev. 107568 2.71 2.72 2.55 17.90
N 170,773
Notes: Prices from Nielsen. Regular price calculated using algorthim from Midrigan Kehoe (2014).
Deflated by Personal Consumption Expenditure: Deflator Food and Beverages. All prices converted
to 12 pack of 12 oz servings equivalent.
For the current supply specification we estimate the costs for only the 12 packs for
the three largest producers (Coors, Miller and Budweiser). In table 1.2 we present
summary statstics of the sample we use for the current supply estimation. The
products in this sample are slightly cheaper and slightly less likely to go on sale than
the entire sample. We plan to extend our supply estimation sample to encompass a
larger portion of the data.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics: Supply Estimation Sample
Monthly Rev Average Price Regular Price Sale Price % on Sale
Mean 71501 9.95 10.04 9.46 10.99
Median 29397 10.04 10.13 9.53 6.52
Std. Dev. 100015 1.03 1.04 1.09 12.91
N 20,630
Notes: Prices from Nielsen. Regular price calculated using algorthim from Midrigan Kehoe (2014).
All prices converted to 12 pack of 12 oz servings equivalent. Includes only the 12 packs of the
leading regular and light beers for Miller Coors and Budwieser.
1.2.1 Reduced form evidence
In this section we look for descriptive evidence suggesting sales matter for under-
standing competition, and document the behavior of prices and sales throughout our
sample. Mergers impact the degree of competition in a market, both in standard
models and as empirically demonstrated by the literature. Since we believe that the
frequency of sales is a strategic variable we investigate the effect of a large merger
on the frequency of sales. In addition, we document the impact of the merger on the
other components of pricing, the regular price and the sale price.
In Figure 1.1 we show the median frequency of sales across markets and months.
The frequency of sales for each market product was calculated by computing the
fraction of quantity sold on sale in each market for each product. We find that the
frequency of sales is fairly volatile, so we present a three month moving average of
the median frequency across stores and products. Sales appear to be more frequent
immediately after the merger for Budweiser and Miller, and increase later for Coors.
From the beginning of 2012 on-wards there is a downward trend in the frequency of
8


















2007m1 2009m1 2011m1 2013m1 2015m1
Bud Coors
Miller
Note: Three month moving average of the median frequency of sales computed across
markets and products. Sales computed using the algorithm from Midrigan Kehoe (2014).
Sales were aggregated to the product market level by computing the fraction of quantity
sold on sale in each market for each product. The red-line highlights the consummation of
the merger between Miller and Coors.
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sales for all of the producers.
In Figure 1.2 we report the median prices across markets and goods for the three
largest producers through time. We see a sizable impact of the merger between Miller
and Coors on each of the levels of the prices. We see this across the average, regular
and sales prices. Noticeably prices rose for Budweiser, while Budweiser was not one
of the merging firms. This cannot be directly interpreted as evidence of collusion
because of the direct effect of a removal of a competitor. Next, we summarize the
effects of the merger on the main strategic variables in regression form.
We show descriptive regression results to summarize the impact of the merger on
the main strategic variables. We run these regressions at the product-market-month
level, SALEjmt is the frequency of sales, MCj is a dummy variable for the product
being sold by Miller-Coors, BUDj is a dummy variable for the product being sold
by Anheuser-Busch Inbev, and postt is a dummy variable for the month being after
the merger was consummated. The inclusion of Michelob, Heineken and Corona are
to form a control group of firms that neither merge nor are conjectured to be part
of a pricing coalition. They are not controlled by any of the three major breweries
but are large national brands. We exclude the period June 2008 to April 2009 to
account for immediate complications leading up to and after the merger. For these
regressions we limit the sample to January 2007 to December 2012 to focus on the
effects of the merger on the strategic variables in the aftermath. We use the following
specification reported in Table 1.3:
10


























































2007m1 2009m1 2011m1 2013m1 2015m1
Budweiser Coors
Miller
Note: Median real prices per 144 oz. Across 32 markets. Prices deflated by the Personal
Consumption Expenditure: Food and Beverage Deflator. Sales computed using the al-
gorithm from Midrigan Kehoe (2014). The red-line highlights the consummation of the
merger between Miller and Coors.
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SALEjmt =βMC ∗MCj + βBUD ∗ BUDj + βmerge ∗ postt
+βMC∗merge ∗MCj ∗ postt
+βBUD∗merge ∗ BUDj ∗ postt + εjmt
Across specifications it is apparent sales increased for not only the merging firms
but for Budweiser as well. The effect becomes larger with the inclusion of brand
specific specific trends suggesting that while the frequency of sales was falling overall
in this market, the merger had a positive effect. Our model presented in Section
1.3 does not imply a monotonic relationship between the frequency of sales and
the degree of collusion. We interpret these results therefore as suggestive of the
importance of changes in competition on the strategic variable that we study, namely
the frequency of price reductions.
We also estimate the effect of the merger on the prices. We run separate regres-
sions on average prices, regular prices, and sale prices. We run a similar difference
in difference as Miller and Weinberg (2017):
log(P)jmt =βMC ∗MCj + βBUD ∗ BUDj + βmerge ∗ postt
+βMC∗post ∗MCj ∗ postt
+βBUD∗post ∗ BUDj ∗ postt + εjmt
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Table 1.3: Frequency of sales
Percent on sale Percent on sale Percent on sale
post -0.019
(0.004)
post*bud 0.013 0.013 0.037
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
post*miller-Coors 0.019 0.019 0.022
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
Brand FEs y y y
Time FEs n y n
Brand Trends n n y
Observations 109,523 109,523 109,523
R-squared 0.006 0.011 0.293
Note: Sales calculated using algorithm from Midrigan Kehoe (2014). The before sample includes
Jan 2007 to June 2008 and April 2009 to December 2012. We include 6 12 24 and 30 packs of
the major brands described in the text. The control group includes Michelob, Corona and Stella
Artios.
Where the left hand side variable log(P)jmt is the deflated average, regular, or sale
price per 144 oz of beer in logarithms. The first column in these tables are without
fixed effects, the second column has date and brand fixed effects, while the last
column has brand fixed effects as well as brand specific trends. All standard errors
here are clustered on date. We model the effect at the market brand-size month
level. We exclude the period May 2008 to April 2009 to account for immediate
complications leading up to and after the merger. For these regressions we limit the
sample to Jan 2007 to December 2011 to focus on the effects of the merger.
These tables show that all prices sharply rose after the merger, for the firms that
merged as well as for Budweiser relative to the other brands. The coefficients appear
slightly smaller with the inclusion of the brand-specific trends which suggest that the
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Table 1.4: Effect of Miller Coors merger on Prices
(a) Average Price
log(P̄ ) log(P̄ ) log(P̄ )
post -0.0445
(0.00348)
post*Budwieser 0.0841 0.0825 0.0410
(0.00370) (0.00374) (0.00419)
post* Miller+Coors 0.0847 0.0826 0.0330
(0.00381) (0.00388) (0.00485)
Observations 109,532 109,532 109,532





post*Budwieser 0.0860 0.0846 0.0464
(0.00345) (0.00349) (0.00364)
post*Miller+Coors 0.0865 0.0845 0.0372
(0.00365) (0.00371) (0.00452)
Observations 109,532 109,532 109,532





post*Budwieser 0.0953 0.0948 0.0355
(0.00319) (0.00321) (0.00490)
post*Miller+Coors 0.0826 0.0821 0.0161
(0.00397) (0.00402) (0.00674)
Observations 72,003 72,003 72,003
R-squared 0.584 0.592 0.995
Brand FEs y y y
Time FEs n y n
Brand Trends n n y
Note: Sales calculated using algorithm from Midrigan Kehoe (2014). The before sample includes
Jan 2007 to June 2008 and April 2009 to December 2012. We include 6 12 24 and 30 packs of
the major brands described in the text. The control group includes Michelob, Corona and Stella
Artios. Standard Errors computed using monthly clusters.
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brands may have prices that trended differently for reasons other than the merger.
This section has shown descriptive evidence of the effects of the merger between
Miller and Coors. While this merger is not the major focus of this paper, it allows
some inference into the effects of a major shift in competitive environment, as well
as important background for the market.
1.3 Model of sales in a collusive equilibrium
In this section we develop a model of price setting that allows for tacit collusion.
We model the producers as setting two prices per market, to fit the reality of regular
prices and lower sales prices. We use this model to give a rationalization for pro-
ducer behavior, then to estimate the cost primitives of the producers, and finally in
section 1.5 we use the model and the estimated primitives to compare the proposed
equilibrium which allows sales to one that does not. To fix ideas we present the
stage game in a very simplified form, only one market and two competitors with one
good each. After this we will show how the game changes as we generalize to many
competitors and many product producers. Finally, we discuss this stage game in the
context of a dynamic game where the producers will play this game repeatedly, but
with primitives that are allowed to change through time.
1.3.1 Setting
We consider a small number of producers (Budweiser, Miller, Coors) that produce
beer. We assume they contract with retailers across several markets. The retailers are
given little latitude in pricing, they can choose which price to offer between the sale
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and regular price that the producer sets, with the total frequency of sale determined
by the producer. They do however, internalize the impact that those prices have
on the profits of the producer (the contracting problem between the retailer and
the producer is solved to maximize the profits of the producer.) In each market we
assume there is a continuum of identical retailers, and a continuum heterogeneous
of consumers at each store. We interpret the results of Anderson Malin Nakuruma
Simester and Stiensson (2017) to mean that some freedom is granted to the retailer
to pick the timing of the sales, but not complete freedom over pricing.
There are several reasons that producers might have an incentive to go on sale,
we assume that the major driver of sales are temporary but large negative shocks
to marginal cost. Other reasons include: a transitory idiosyncratic demand shock, a
transitory but common demand shock, and purely out of inter-temporal or general
price discrimination. We believe the cost shock is the most natural in this context
for the following reasons. Firstly, a transitory product-level demand shock would
cause producers to temporarily raise their prices, contrary to the observation of price
reductions. We also do not believe that the transitory product demand component is
that important in the beer market. Next, we believe that there are common demand
shocks in the beer market, however these are likely driven by forecast-able events–
such as sporting events, holidays, or seasons–are not private information, we choose
not to focus on these. Temporary sales could arise out of the desire to take advantage
of inter-temporal price discrimination. However, we believe that beer is less likely
to be stored between weeks or months than other goods traditionally considered,
such as laundry detergent. We also take the view that price discrimination without
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a underlying shock is unlikely as a source of temporary price reductions, we believe
that the presence of cost shocks is a primitive that producers can coordinate over. It
is possible in theory for sales to be rationalized without transitory shocks; however,
we believe that cost shocks are the most natural source.
For each product the producer receives an idiosyncratic shock to its cost, we
interpret this as reflecting a negative shock to the cost of the good. This shock is
private information to the other producers, therefore the other producers consider
the realization of the shock as a random variable when setting their prices. One way
this shock could be interpreted as unexpected excess inventory, where the cost reflects
not the cost of production but the opportunity cost of the storage and carrying cost.
These costs could even become negative, justified by a lack of free disposal. In each
period of play producers first choose a regular price for each product in each market,
then they choose a sale price for those goods that receive the large cost shock, and
for each good that does not decides whether to mimic the sale price or stay at the
regular price.
We assume that there is a continuum of identical stores in each market and that
the shocks to marginal cost are independent across stores. This implies that the
incentive constraint from the producer’s perspective depends shares equal to the
probability of the shock, or the probability of the price that other producers will
charge. We assume at each store there is a continuum of heterogeneous consumers,
where the distribution is identical across retailer in the same market. We do not
consider strategic behavior on part of the consumers, other than for producers to
face an identical static demand system at each retailer.
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1.3.2 Simple Stage-Game Model
We begin with the two producer case where each producer has a single product
to fix ideas, and then we generalize to the multi-product producer multi-producer
model we estimate.
Consider a two stage game where producers choose the regular price in the first
stage and in the second stage decide whether or not to put their product on sale.
After firms choose the regular price is stage 1, the cost of each producer cj ∈ {cNj , cSj }
is revealed to the producer at which point the producer can decide to go on sale or
not. The product’s marginal price will either be normal cNj with probability 1 − rj
or low cSj with probability rj. While the distribution of each firms costs is public
information, the realizations are private. Firms learn their own costs, and then
determine the sale price, and whether to go on sale. Then the firms can choose
to lower their prices so as to defect from the dynamic equilibrium, defection can
only take place for products not on sale. This assumption is equivalent to assuming
producers can only change their price once in the second period.
The equilibrium strategy that we consider is as follows: in stage 1, producers
choose a collusive regular price pRj that yields a higher profit then the Bertrand Nash
equilibrium, unless in the history of play any producers did not choose this price, at
which point all firms will play the Bertrand Nash forever. If any producers chooses
any other price at this stage, all producers play the Nash Bertrand equilibrium
strategy in the second stage, this means no firm will deviate in this stage.
In stage 2, retailers that have cost cSj will choose the optimal price p
S
j for that
product in the current period only. This a substantive assumption on the equilibrium,
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effectively the other producers are giving the producer a chance to take full advantage
of the shock. If retailers have cost cNj they will mix between playing their regular
price with probability 1 − mj and sale price with probability mj. Then producers
could deviate in all retailers simultaneously. Finally, producers realize profits and
learn the other firm’s prices. 4
Solution to stage 2:
Take pR = (pR1 , p
R
2 ) as given. Note that under the equilibrium strategy, the other




2 : (1− r2)(1−m2) ⇒ (1− α2)
pS2 : r2 + (1− r2)m2 ⇒ α2

Following the equilibrium strategy, pS1 is the optimal price for firm 1 in a single
period. Then pS1 solves:
max
p1
(1− α)(p1 − cS1 )q1(p1, pR2 ) + α(p1 − cS1 )q1(p1, pS2 )




2 , we can solve for p
S
1 .
5 The same is true for pS2 . Therefore the
sale price can be written: pSi (p
R, α1, α2).
When retailers do not receive the shock: c1 = c
S
1 , in the equilibrium strategy they
will play a mixed strategy. To do so, player 1 will be indifferent between playing pR1
4Bernheim and Whinston (1990) argue that if you are going to be punished, you might as well
deviate in all markets and all products.
5We assume that the demand system is sufficiently smooth and well behaved to allow this.
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and pS1 . Therefore:
πN1 (p
R
1 , p2) = (p
R
1 − cN1 )
{




1 , p2) = (p
S
1 − cN1 )
{
(1− α2)q1(pS1 , pR2 ) + α2q1(pS1 , pS2 )
}
Additionally for mixed-strategy to be an equilibrium strategy, producer 2 must








1 ). Same for producer 1 and α1.
Incentive Constraints:
When ci = c
S




i , because playing mixed-strategy implies producers are indifferent between
playing pRi and p
S
i , producers have no incentive to deviate from one to the other.
Producers do have the incentive to deviate to a price other than pRi and p
S
i . The
equilibrium strategy punishment scheme to stop this behavior is a return to the
Nash-Bertrand equilibrium. This constraint must be considered by the producers























1 , p2) + (1− r1)m1πN1 (pS1 , p2)
]
6Additionally, in the single product market producers would not want to change the price from






1 , p2)] ≥ Ep2 [α1πN1 (pD1 , p2)]. Producers will take into ac-
count the constraint and how it changes when choosing pRi . We have shown that
our conjectured equilibrium indeed is an equilibrium of the stage game, and now will
discuss the more general model.
1.3.3 Multi-producer Multi-product stage game
In this section we extend the model from the previous section to encompasses more
realistic cases, multiple markets, multiple producers, and multi product producers.
First we introduce subscripts for the notation. There will be a continuum of
consumers i in each market m at each time period (month) t. There are producers
f , that sell products j ∈ Fj in stores s. We assume that consumers visit one store
from the continuum of stores, which are ex ante identical, consumers only learn the
prices the store charges upon arrival and cannot switch stores.
We assume that all the costs (cSjmt, c
N
jmt and rjmt) as well as the demand unob-
servables (δjmt) follow exogenous first order Markov processes. This allows us to
separate the periods of the game, the only endogenous state variable is previous play
of the game. We name these states Θt.
Timing of the model within each period:
1. First, mcSjmt the level of the shocked marginal cost of good j, mc
N
jmt the level
of the unshocked marginal cost of good j , and δjmt the mean utilities of each
good are revealed. In addition, the frequency of the marginal cost shocks rjmt
is revealed. These are all public information.
2. Second, each producer give all retailers the same instructions for each good
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in a market. The retailers will choose between P sjmt the sale price, and P
R
jmt
the no sale or regular price. Retailers will be allowed to sell at the sale price
αjmt of the time, (this contains the same information as is given by stating the
mixed strategy µjmt as rjmt is known to all parties.) Defection at this stage is
possible, however as it can be immediately punished in the current period t no
producer will defect here.
3. Retailers realize the cost shock, this is private information to the other produc-
ers. The retailer will choose P sjmt with certainty if it has received the shock.
If it has not it will play pSjmt with probability mjmt and P
R
jmt with probability
(1 −mjmt). Stores make the pricing decision and the decision whether to go
on sale without knowledge of the shock for other goods, or indeed the shocks
and prices at other stores.
4. Finally, the producers decide whether to send the signal to defect, only un-
shocked goods at stores will sell products at the single shot deviation profit
maximizing price. Other producers cannot respond until the next period. As
there is a continuum of stores, the producers will treat the decision to defect
as if the profit were the expectation.
We previously proved an equilibrium exists for the two producer single product
producer case, here is a sketch of the proof for the more general world: as the regular
prices are chosen to maximize profits given the incentive compatibility constraint
is satisfied the producers do not wish to deviate to a different regular price. After
resolution of uncertainty the shocked products will be sold at a price that solves the
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static profit maximization problem. The unshocked products will have prices that
are some times the sale price and at others the regular price, because this results
from a mixed strategy the producer will be indifferent between choosing the sale or
regular price. Therefore the producer will have incentive to deviate to either price.
Defecting producers would defect in every product that has not been put on sale.
1.3.4 Dynamic Game: Pareto Refinement
Producers play a dynamic game where each period evolves as above. We assume
that there are no endogenous state variables beyond a binary variable that contains
whether any producer has defected in the past. This ensures that prices chosen today
have no impact future choices except where the cause punishment. We assume that
the dynamic game has symmetric grim trigger strategies in equilibrium. That is
the producers will play a specific collusive regular price outlined below, a sale price
consistent with single shot profit maximization given they have received the shock,
and a frequency of sale that is consistent with the mixed strategy in each market. If
any producer fails to play this strategy all producers will interpret that as defection
and will price at the single shot Nash Bertrand Equilibrium for all periods after the
current one.7
In order to make progress towards estimation we take a further refinement that
we believe is natural. We assume producers act as if profit were maximized by a
planner with Pareto weights ωf . Black Crawford Liu and White (2005) introduced
7If any producer were to defect before the end of a certain stage, they could be punished imme-
diately therefore the only deviation we have to consider is at the end of the period.
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this refinement in the context of a price setting game terming it “Virtual Stakes”.
More recently Fan and Sullivan (2019) have examined the assumption in more detail.
The assumption of Pareto optimalitity ensures that no producer could earn a higher
profit without another producer suffering. Per period welfare is:














t+τ ; Θt+τ )
However, since we have assumed that all the components of Θt follows exogenous
first order Markov, and we only ever observe producers playing the collusive part of












jmt, p−jmt(s)) + (1− rjmt)πNjmt(pR, p−jmt(s)))
is expected profit from the perspective of the first sub-period (before learning the
realization of the marginal cost shock), p−j(s) represents the vector of all other
prices and s the state of the other shocks. The expected profit from good j when




s f(s)(1 −mjmt) ∗ (pRjmt −
cNjmt)qjmt(p
R
jmt, p−jmt) +mjmt ∗ (pSjmt− cNjmt)qjmt(pRjmt, p−jmt)) (mjmt is the probability
of going on sale when the product do not receive the shock, when products are going
on sale from the mixed strategy). The profit from good j when the retailer does





jmt − cSjmt)qjmt(pSjmt, p−jmt).
There are a series of constraints to ensure this remains an equilibrium on path.
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≥ Eπf0(pD, pR−f )− πf0(pR)
Where PD is the single shot profit maximizing deviation price for all products the
producer owns, pR−f is the on equilibrium path prices for all goods the producer does
not own, and PB is the price vector coming from the punishment phase and any
return to the equilibrium path. We have no data on defection or punishment, as we
have assumed the producers have always been on the equilibrium path for our sample.
For this reason we assume that the punishment is grim trigger, that is play the single
shot Nash Equilibrium for all periods into the future. The constraint is that each
producer must not wish to deviate from it’s regular price after the revelation of the
levels of its marginal costs. This framework was introduced by Black Crawford Lui
and White (2005). Other papers such as Fan and Sullivan (2019), and Bernheim and
Whinston (1990) have used the same constraints on equilibrium.
Therefore the tacitly collusive arrangement’s problem can be rewritten as a series





















D, pR−f )− πf0(pR)
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Producers operate as if they were maximizing the joint profits with these constraints
and weights. Intuitively producers care about the impact of their action (i) Their
own profit, (ii) The profit of the other producer, (iii) the incentives to deviate in
the second sub period. Notice the owner of j does not consider how changing pj will
impact the deviation price as that assumed that pj for all j ∈ F is chosen to maximize
single period profit. The producer knows that it will be able to pick its deviation
prices in the future. πDf (P
R), the defection profit differs slightly from Eπf (PR) in
that the deviations are only made for goods that are not on sale, those on sale have
their prices locked in.
On the equilibrium path regular prices and the sale prices will be accepted by the
other members of the tacitly collusive arrangement, they will not be punished. How-
ever, all other prices will be considered cheating and be punished by Nash reversion.
We assume that producers have a window to defect only after all other prices are
set. Defections could happen at earlier stages, however those could be detected and
punished, as every producer can defect at the last stage.
In contrast to traditional models of collusion, decreases in price to take advantage
of a cost shock will not be punished. In addition the other producers will not know
whether any individual retailer has received the shock for that good, this gives pro-
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ducers the incentive to allow retailers to mimic the state where they were shocked,
by going on sale occasionally when they did not receive the shock.
We now turn to estimation of the primitives of this model.
1.4 Estimation
1.4.1 Demand
We estimate a random coefficient nested logit demand system. This allows for
flexible estimation of cross price elasticity, papers such as Miller Weinberg (2017)
and De Loecker Scott (2016) use similar models for the beer industry. We have
credible exogenous variation due transportation costs, we can use the national cost
of fuel interacted with the distance from the brewery (or port of import) to the
market. We observe weekly transactions at every store in the Nielsen data, however
we aggregate to the market month level for our structural analysis in part to alleviate
concerns about storage, as well as to reduce measurement error. Prices are averaged
across stores weighted by the volume of sales (we use observed transaction prices here
neither sale or regular directly). We follow Miller Weinberg (2017) by building the
distribution of preferences as functions of the income of household. We sample one
hundred household per market from the American Community Survey. We use their
income to build the distribution of prefernces allowing the constant as well as the
coefficients for light beer, and for price to depend on the income of the households.
Utility of the customer j in market m for good i at time t is:
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uijmt =α0income ∗ incomejt
+ (αprice + αprice,income ∗ incomejt) ∗ (priceimt)
+ (αlight,income ∗ incomejt) ∗ (lighti)
+ τt + τi + τm
+ ζjt + (1− ρ) ∗ εijt
Where ζjt is distributed so εijt is iid extreme value. ρ is the nesting coefficient on
the inside option on the consumption of any beer in our sample. τt, τi, τm are time,
product and market fixed effects respectively.
We use as non-linear instruments: mean income interacted with constant, prices,
and light, as is suggested by Gandhi Houde (2016). We use the number of products
as an instrument for the nesting parameter. To estimate the coefficients of the
demand system in this paper, we use the posted price averaged over the stores in
each market in each period weighting by total sales. We use only the best selling
brands, that is Miller, Coors, Budweiser, Michelob, Stella Artios and Heineken in the
6-pack, 12-pack, 18-pack, 24-pack and 30-pack of their leading brand and its light
counterpart.8
Table 1.5 reports the non-linear coefficients for the estimated demand system.
8All the data come from the 5000 Beer, and the 5001 Light Beer categories in the Nielsen Retail
Scanner data.
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Note: Standard Errors clustered by month. Data market-product-monthly from Jan 2007 to Dec
2015, across 32 markets. Instruments include mean income interacted with constant price and light
dummy, as well as fuel cost and the number of products.
They suggest that as household’s income increases the demand for beer increases, as
well as their preference for light beer while these relationship are fairly weak. The
interaction between income and the price coefficient is also positive which suggests
that as consumers have higher income their price sensitivity decreases. The mean
elasticity appears to be within range of the relevant literature.
1.4.2 Supply
For the supply side estimation we face several conceptual issues. Firstly, for
each store we only observe a sale price and a regular price when the good is on
sale, otherwise we only observe the regular price. Secondly, some stores charge a
permanently higher price than other stores, and discount from that price when on
sale. To solve these issues we construct the average depth of sales in all stores in
the market in a given period. We also calculate the average regular price across all
stores in the market, from this we generate an sale price for the market time period
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by taking the average depth below the regular price. We construct the frequency
of sales by taking the average of number of sale weeks weighted by the quantity of
sales in each store divided by the number of weeks in each month. This gives us a
continuous measure of the frequency of sales in each market.
In order to reduce the complexity of computation we focus on only 2 products per
firm for the supply estimation, the flag ship beer and the light version9 these account
for the 20% of the total revenue of the total sample. We do this as the number
of states grows exponentially in the number of goods in each market (2J because
each good can either be on sale or not). To generate a sale price and regular price
at the market level, we construct an representative regular price by averaging the
regular price charged at every store weighted by the volume of sales. We construct
the sale price by averaging the depth of the sale in percent across stores that are on
sale. This is to alleviate the problem of heterogeneity in which stores go on sale, if
the higher price stores on average were to go on sale the average sale price might
be higher than the regular price. We compute the frequency of sale by taking the
simple average across stores of whether that store had a sale on that good. We
assume that each product receives a shocked marginal cost independently across all
stores. Additionally, we assume that the shock is independent across goods with in
the same market or store.
We aggregate profit by summing across markets and products in a time t, the
dervivatives are calculated at the market level are added weighted by market size.
We recall some of the assumptions from Section 1.3 that allow us to solve the model.
9(Budweiser, Bud Light, Miller High Life, Miller Light, Coors Light and Coors.)
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Firstly, we assume that the P Sj solves a single period maximization. Producers
allow retailers to charge a price that comes from this first order condition. This
is effectively a free pass from the other producers to charge the best price given a
retailer has received the shock. Notice the choice is for only the products that have
received the shock. That is:








(pj′(s)−mcj′(s)) ∗ q′j(p, P−j(s)}
Where f(s) is the probability of a given state s is realized, conditional on the
good j being shocked and P−j(s) is a vector of the prices of the other goods in this
market in this state.
This equation gives a set of first order conditions:
∑
s|jshocked










These first order conditions, information on prices, the frequency of sales and a
guess of the marginal costs in the non-shocked states can be used to back out the
marginal cost in the shocked state. These form one half of the matrix we invert to
recover marginal costs/markups from data, conditional on the frequency of shocks.
The other half comes from the required indifference between choosing the regular
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and sale price when the firm has not received the shock.
We also require an assumption about the retailers information sets and how those
relate to the choices they make. We restrict each firm to only consider the mixed
strategy in a single product at a time. This will allow us given a guess of the markups
of each firm in the unshocked state to find the mixed strategy that each firm plays
to hold each other firm indifferent between sale and not in their unshocked state.
Consider with out loss of generality the mixed strategy of good i holding firm j’s
profits equal across sale and not sale. We only need to consider the state where firm
j have not received the cost shock. All other firms sale or not sale prices will be
unknown to the retailer considering good j and therefore will have to encapsulated
in an expectation we denote E−i,−j.















j , p−i,−j)− Πj(pRi , pRj , p−i,−j)
]
= 0
Since we directly observe αi we can write these equations as functions of data
and of unobservables. These equations form another set of linear conditions that we
use to recover the marginal costs from observed behavior. In practice this yields as
many conditions for each good j as goods the firm does not control. In estimation
we average them.
Given data on the frequency of temporary price reductions and a guess of the
frequency of the shocks, the mixed strategy is known. Therefore for every market-
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month we can compute the marginal cost associated with shocked and the unshocked
marginal costs for each good conditional on the frequency of the shock, based on the
matrix described in section this includes the first order condition for the maximization
of the product after the shock, and the indifference condition between the sale price
and the regular price for the unshocked firm. This linear system is J equations in J
unknowns. We take the first order condition for the choice of the regular price:
At this stage we have enough information to write the profit maximizing first
order condition at the beginning of each period solely as a function of data and one
set of unobservables, the frequency of the shocks to marginal cost for each firm in





to ensure that rjmt a probability between zero and αjmt, that is to say consistent
with the model.






























f ′ , P
R







Where both the expectations and the profit functions through marginal costs
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depend on the vector of the frequency of the shocks rmt. We recover a r̂jmt for
each product market and period, conditional on the profit weights and Lagrange
multipliers.






This νSjmt is the main structural residual we recover, it shifts the marginal costs
and expected profit functions through the conditions we impose listed above.
In order to generate the sample analogues of the above first order condition several
terms are required, firstly we need to solve the deviating firm’s problem. To do this
we solve for the optimal prices of each product that has not received the cost shock,
nor gone on sale, given every other firms prices. We do this in every state and
calculate the derivatives given each state to aggregate to the expected derivative.
Secondly, we need to consider how changing the regular price will change the sales
price that the firm will charge given it has a shock. Finally, the firms internalize
that changing regular prices will change the frequency with which they will put the
goods on sale through the mixed strategy.
1.4.3 Identification
This section discusses the identification of the various components of our model
of supply. We can separately identify the profit weight parameters ωft from the La-
grange multipliers λft because due to the timing assumptions the firms only consider
goods that have not received the shock, nor been put on sale in the given period when
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considering defection. The relative response of the producer to the components of
the entire profit function, versus solely those components that it considers for the
most profitable deviation separately identify ωft and λft.
We then form moments in νSjmt (the random component of the frequency of the
shock to marginal cost). We use as instruments the demand conditions that are
plausibly exogenous to the supply conditions, we use the average income in each
market, the number of products offered in each market, as well as the average fuel
cost of competing product and the local preference for competing goods. We weight
each summand in the moment condition by the fraction of revenue each firm gen-
erates from that product-market pair. We believe these instruments contain useful
variation that shift the incentives to deviate, we face an endogenity problem as the
prices in each market are determined by equilibrium. We need instruments that shift
market prices that are independent of the producer’s cost processes. Our choice of
instruments follows Berry Haile (2014), while we differ in the specification of costs.
We believe that the frequency of the shock is identified by the relative weight the
producer places on the markup of the sale price above the shocked cost. If rjmt is
small than the markup of the mimicking retailer (sale price above unshocked cost) will
be have relatively more important. The marginal costs are identified by the behavior
of the producers when they receive the shock (the static first order condition) and
by their behavior when they do not (the indifference condition between sales and
regular price in the mixed strategy).
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1.4.4 Estimation Results
We present the main results of our estimation of the supply side of the model.
We estimate a separate profit weight and Lagrange multiplier for each period in our
model. We normalize the profit weights ωft to sum to one. (
∑
f ωft = 1). This is
a substantive assumption as it implies that all three firms (or two after the Miller-
Coors merger) are within the same coalition. We believe, however in this context
it is justified as these are the largest players in this market and other research has
shown evidence of their collusion.
While some interpretation is possible for these parameters, they have serious short
comings. Following on a long history of attempting to estimate “conduct” param-
eters (Breshnan 1981 for example) or “conjectoral variations”, several authors have
cast significant doubt on whether such parameters allow meaningful counterfactuals.
Corts (1999) suggests that parameters estimated from pooling across different time
periods do not reflect the correct marginal trade-offs a firm faces but instead average
across different trade-offs. The parameters we estimate come from a single decision
horizon for the producers (at least with respect to our modelling assumptions), which
partially address this concern. However, the parameters are only consistent with this
equilibrium with these primitives, we do not know how the parameters change as the
equilibrium changes. This means that we must be very selective in interpretation,
as well as in their usage for counterfactuals.
What more easily interpreted, however, is the markups above cost that the firms
charge during the periods we have estimated the model. The mean regular prices and
unshocked costs, which are computed by taking a weighted by sales average across
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2007m1 2009m1 2011m1 2013m1 2015m1
date
Regular Price Normal Marginal Cost
Note: Weighted average across markets and products for each month and brand. Estimation
procedure described in text for marginal costs. Regular prices are taken from monthly product
averages of the regular prices computed using the algorithm form Midrigan (2011).
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date
Sale Price Shocked Marginal Cost
Note: Weighted average across markets and products for each month and brand. Estimation
procedure described in text for marginal costs. Sale prices are calculated from monthly product
averages of the depth of sales from the differences from regular price, then discounted from average
regular prices. Regular prices were computed using the algorithm form Midrigan (2011).
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all markets at a given time is presented in Figure 1.3. The markup is the difference
between the price (top line) and the cost (bottom line). We also present the sales
price and shocked marginal costs in Figure 1.4. The sales prices are lower than the
regular price, but the shocked prices are much lower than the unshocked prices. This
implies that the markup given the firm has received the shock is much higher than
the markup given it has not. Since the merger was consummated in July 2008, we
see a large shake up in the competitive environment after that point. We see that
the markups and prices rise after that time. The markups for Miller Coors rose by
much more than the markups for Budweiser. Relative to Budweiser it appears that
Miller-Coors did have some substantial cost reductions.
Somewhat unusually, our estimates of marginal costs are negative in the shocked
state on average. We believe this is plausible in our context because the shocks
are motivated by supply chain or inventory shocks. In the case that a retailer or
distributor has excess inventories they need to either sell them or dispose of them
before expiration. In this case we motivate the marginal cost to include not cost of
production, but the opportunity cost of holding the excess inventories, as well as the
costs of disposal.
While the slightly negative marginal costs are plausibe, the ones we find are too
large to be consistent with free disposal. We are endeavoring to examine the source,
the demand system may be too inflexible and rationalize the sales only with very
large markups that imply negative marginal costs. Additionally, our supply side
may not be well identifying the conduct seperately from marginal cost. For these
reasons we are exploring a more flexible demand system, and estimating the conduct
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parameters pooling across time which will allow for unobserved hetrogenity in the
costs.
To summarize the direct impact of the merger we compute the averages across
the time periods for a before merger, and immediately post merger. We include
January 2007 to May 2008 as the pre sample and May 2009 to December 2012.
This are the same time periods we use in the difference in difference regressions in
Section 1.2. We present these averages in table 1.6. It is apparent from this table
that the regular prices rose for each firm, while the marginal cost rose for Budweiser
and stayed mostly stable or fell for Miller-Coors. The shocked marginal costs rose
nearer to zero, while the sale prices rose. The markup of sale price over shocked
costs appears to not have differed as a result of the merger.
1.5 Comparision of Equilibria
That an equilibrium exists with sales is not enough to argue that the producers
go on sale for this reason. We need to show that there is some benefit to selecting
the sales equilibrium. There are two outcomes we consider: profitability of each firm,
and the ease at which the tacitly collusive arrangement can be sustained. The sales
equilibrium should be preferable to a non-sales equilibrium in at least one of these
two criteria. In this section, we show that for our sample and estimated primitives,
the sales equilibrium is preferable in both criteria to a non-sales equilibrium where
each firm uses only the observed regular price with certainty.
In order to evaluate the sustainability of the equilibrium we propose, we need both
a notion of sustainability, and another equilibrium to compare to ours. We follow the
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Table 1.6: Means of main strategic variables:
Pre and Post merger
Budwieser Miller Coors
Regular Price pre 9.86 8.97 9.83
post 10.65 9.39 10.37
Markup pre 3.80 3.91 3.61
post 3.28 4.39 4.45
Unshocked MC pre 6.06 5.06 6.22
post 7.36 5.00 5.92
Budwieser Miller Coors
Sale Price pre 9.05 8.19 9.08
post 9.80 8.74 9.56
Markup pre 13.89 14.12 13.71
post 12.66 13.45 13.42
Shocked MC pre -4.84 -5.93 -4.63
post -2.86 -4.71 -3.86
Note: Weighted average across markets and products for each month and brand.
Estimation procedure described in text for marginal costs. Sale prices are calculated
from monthly product averages of the depth of sales from the differences from regular
price, then discounted from average regular prices. Regular prices were computed
using the algorithm form Midrigan (2011). We include January 2007 to May 2008
as the pre sample and May 2009 to December 2012 as the post sample.
existing literature in the first point, beginning with Abreu (1986, 1988), which study
of these dynamic or repeated games of collusion. This literature has focused on the
threshold discount factor. Given the equilibrium, and specification of the defection
and punishment, while taking some stance on the firms’ beliefs about the future,
papers find the discount factor that would make the producers indifferent between
collusion and defection. Intuitively, the higher this discount factor the more difficult
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collusion is to sustain. Recent papers such as Eizenberg and Shillan (2019) use these
threshold discount factors to characterize the stability of collusive arrangements.
As discussed in Sullivan (2017) the researcher must take a stance on the producers
beliefs about the future flow of profits under both collusion and defection. One
stance has been used is that the primitives Θt is held to be constant at the time of
the decision to defect, firms would then believe that collusive profits today would
continue identically if collusion were sustained. The researcher then finds the Nash
Bertrand equilibrium10 of the stage game and conjectures that the firms believe the
punishment of the single shot Nash Equilibrium would continue forever if any firm
was to defect. With knowledge of the primitives of current stage the researcher has




that holds each firm f indifferent between defecting and continuing to collude. Profits
reflect the total profits aggregated across markets and products of each firm at that
time. We follow the existing literature and consider when the discount factor differs




10For the primitives we consider, the marginal costs will still be random variables. however, there
will be no reason to post a regular price in the first stage. In the Nash Bertrand equilibrium each
product will have a price that will be charged when the product gets the shock and a price that
will be charged when it does not.
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. Sullivan (2017) notes that the producers should internalize that Θt evolves through
time, as well as the equilibrium strategies that respond to it. In future work we hope
to model this directly, in this paper we assume the firms believe that the current
equilibrium and profits will continue forever.
We consider for comparison the equilibrium where each firm charges the regular
price we observe in the data, and does not ever go on sale.11 We believe this is a
natural equilibrium to consider, using observed prices is the simplest to compute
candidate equilibrium. We consider this equilibrium with the same primitives as the
sales equilibrium in each period. The strategy is comparable to our sales equilibrium,
firms will cooperate by charging the regular price in each period, defection will come
in the form of setting optimal prices dependent on the presence of the marginal
shock, and punishment takes the same form as the sales game. In fact the Nash
Bertrand equilibrium will be the same for each game, making comparison easier.
This is because the game has no history dependence beyond the recall of defection.
We compute the per period collusive profit for our sales equilibrium and the no-
sales equilibrium. We show the history of the ratio between the sales and no-sales
equilibrium profits in Figure 1.5. This number is greater than one when the sales
equilibrium is more profitable than no-sales equilibrium. In Table 1.7 we report
summary statistics over time for this ratio. In this table we also sum across all firms
to show the industry profit is also always larger in the equilibrium that allows sales.
11In this section we winsorize the markups we compute at 0 and 20, while there are not many
observations that fall outside this range, they make computing new equilibria infeasible. As each
object is reported in terms of ratios in this section we believe that our results will not be overly
sensitive to other choices of bounds.
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2007m1 2009m1 2011m1 2013m1 2015m1
date
Budwieser Miller Coors
Note: This graph shows the 3 month moving average of the ratio between collusive
profits in our sales equilibrium and the no sales equilibrium. A number greater than
one reflects the fact that the firms generate more profit in the sales equilibrium.
Calculation described in text.
We have established that the sales equilibrium is more profitable than the non-
sales equilibrium we consider. Next, we turn our attention now to the sustainability of
collusion. In Table 1.8 we report the mean and median across time for the minimum
discount factor that supports the each of the sales and no-sales equilibrium. The
sales equilibrium has on average a lower level of the minimum discount factor , we
interpret this as illustrating that the no-sales equilibrium is harder to sustain. In
figure 1.6 we show the three month moving average of the maximum across firms of
the minimum discount factor. Clearly the no sales equilibrium has a larger required
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Table 1.7: Summary Statistics: Ratio of Profits
Average Min. Max.
Aggregate 1.03 1.01 1.05
Budweiser 1.04 1.02 1.08
Miller 1.02 1.01 1.05
Coors 1.03 1.01 1.04
Note: This table shows the ratio between the collusive profit for the sales equilibrium
to the no-sales equilibrium. Aggregate is computed by summing across all the firms
in the pricing coalition.
discount factor in most periods. In addition it appears the minimum discount factor
after the merger, this might be interpreted as the firms now more able to cooperate
and therefore able to raise profits by choosing a more difficult equilibrium to sustain.
Table 1.8: Summary Statistics: Discount Factor
Min. Discount Factor:
Sales Eqm No Sales Eqm
Mean 0.74 0.80
Median 0.80 0.83
In order to show the origin of these results, we show in Table 1.9 the ratios of
defection profits, and collusive profits to the Nash Bertrand profits for Miller-Coors
in March 2009. Here we see that the sale equilibrium has a higher collusive profit,
while the no sale equilibrium has a larger profit from defection. The following formula





















2007m1 2009m1 2011m1 2013m1 2015m1
date
Min. discount factor Min. discount factor (PR only)
Note: This graph shows the 3 month moving average of the maximum across firms
of the minimum discount factor that makes each equilibrium sustainable. A larger
number means a less sustainable equilibrium. Calculation described in text.
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Where πdefecttf is the defection profit, π
NB
ft is the Nash Bertrand profit, and π
C
ft is
the collusive profit. All else equal with a larger collusive profit the firm will have a
larger punishment from defection, and a smaller incentive to defect. Additionally,
all else equal the larger the defection profit the greater the incentive to defect. Table
1.9 is representative of the source of the result that the sale equilibrium is more
sustainable.
Table 1.9: Source of sustainability: Profits
Defection Profit Collusive Profit Discount Factor
to NB Profit to NB Profit
Sale Eqm 1.48 1.12 0.75
No Sale Eqm 1.54 1.09 0.83
Note: This table reports ratios of profits to Nash Bertrand profit for Miller-Coors in
March 2009.
There are other potential equilibrium we could consider, in fact there are many
even with in the set of Pareto optimal equilibria. In particular we believe examining
the equilibrium that delivers the same collusive profits but without sales would allow
us to further investigate the effects of allowing sales on the stability of collusion.
Alternatively, we could consider an equilibrium with equal sustainability and examine
the profitability.
We conclude that not only is the sales equilibrium more profitable than an em-
pirically natural comparison equilibrium, but it is more sustainable than the same
equilibrium. We believe that not do sales allow the firms to take advantage of op-
portunities in the form of price reductions, but also that the price reductions relieve
the pressure to defect making the equilibrium easier to sustain.
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1.6 Conclusion
In this paper we show that considering temporary price reductions to our un-
derstanding of competition and collusion adds not only a real world feature but
important information for the inference in the competitive state of a given market.
We have also compared the equilibrium that allows firms to put their products on
sale to an equilibrium where they cannot. We find that the no sales equilibrium
has lower profit, and is more difficult to sustain. Sales allow some flexibility in the




Does Product Revenue Matter for Price Setting
and Monetary Policy Transmission?
2.1 Introduction
The macroeconomic literature on price setting has mostly ignored variation in
product revenue, and its effect on price setting behavior and monetary policy trans-
mission. There is little evidence in either direction, as to whether revenue should
or should not influence such outcomes. In this paper, we examine the relationship
between the price and the revenue of a product, and its consequences for monetary
policy. We find that revenue variation across products and through time directly af-
fects price setting decisions and the transmission of monetary policy. In other words,
revenue is not neutral in the firm’s pricing problem.
Many studies treat revenue as neutral and assume away revenue variation in the
price setting problem. In contrast, we find evidence of revenue non-neutrality in
price setting. We find a positive relationship between product revenue and the prob-
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ability of adjustment, as well as a negative relationship between product revenue
and the absolute size of adjustment in the data. Using a menu cost framework, we
demonstrate that these facts imply non-neutrality of revenue in the pricing problem.
This non-neutrality has important consequences for monetary policy transmission.
Under non-neutrality, monetary policy shocks have heterogeneous effects on prices
depending on product revenue. We show that the responsiveness of prices to a
monetary shock increases in revenue under non-neutrality; both empirically, and in
the class of menu cost models consistent with our empirical findings. Therefore,
the degree of monetary transmission is directly affected by the treatment of revenue
variation in menu cost models. In addition, the non-neutrality of product revenue
can generate a counter-cyclical force that strengthens the real effect of monetary
policy during recessions.
First, using a theoretical framework akin to Caballero and Engel (2007), we il-
lustrate how revenue variation affects pricing behavior. In menu cost models, the
relationship between price setting behavior and revenue can be summarized by the
relationship between revenue and the menu cost. For neutrality to hold, the menu
cost must scale one-for-one with product revenue. In such a case, there would be
no correlation between product revenue and neither the probability nor the absolute
size of price adjustment. If the menu cost increases less then proportionally with
revenue, then the probability of price adjustment should increase, and the size of
adjustment should decrease with product revenue. In this case, revenue variation
matters for the real effect of monetary policy.1
1We note that studies that attempt to measure menu costs directly usually suggest that menu
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We establish a theoretical relationship between product revenue and the response
of prices to monetary shocks. We derive expressions for both the intensive margin
component of price responsiveness and the extensive margin component, and its
dependence on product revenue. We show that the relationship between revenue
and the price response to a monetary shock has the same sign and is proportional in
magnitude to the relationship between product revenue and the probability of price
adjustment, as long as it is more likely for the firm’s actual price to be close to its
desired price than far from it.
Next, we test for revenue neutrality using our predictions on the relationships
between product revenue and price adjustment. Using scanner data of retail goods,
we find that the probability of price adjustment increases with product revenue,
and the average size of price adjustment decreases with product revenue. These
relationships are robust to various controls and are driven not only by cross-sectional
differences in product or retailer characteristics but also by the variation in revenue
of a product across time. In addition, we show that the responsiveness of prices to
high frequency federal funds rate shocks also increases with product revenue. The
average total response of prices of products in the lowest quantile of revenue is 19%
of that of products in the highest quantile of revenue after 12 months and 26% after
18 months. To the best of our knowledge, these facts are new to this paper.2
costs do not scale perfectly with product revenue (Zbaracki et al., 2004, Levy et al., 1997).
2Some papers have noted that there is a relationship between firm size and price changes,
including notably, Goldberg and Hellerstein (2011). Bhattarai and Schoenle (2014) insinuate that
larger firms change price more frequently, as larger firms are more likely to sell more goods. However,
these results focus on the characteristics of price setting in the cross-section at the firm level. Our
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Taken together, our theoretical and empirical findings imply revenue non-neutrality
and heterogeneity across products in the response to monetary shocks. Therefore,
to study the quantitative implications of revenue variation on the real effect of mon-
etary policy, we utilize a menu cost model augmented to match the behavior of the
revenue distribution across the business cycle.
First, we verify that revenue variation generates large differences in the respon-
siveness of prices to a monetary shock across products as we have claimed. The
prices of products with higher revenue are more responsive to monetary shocks when
revenue is non-neutral, whereas, in a revenue neutral economy, the difference is min-
imal. We find that in our model, the price response can differ by as much as twofold
across products with different levels of revenue due to non-neutrality. This accounts
for approximately 40% of the difference found in our empirical results. The heteroge-
neous response of prices leads to a large difference in the aggregate output response
to a monetary shock between revenue neutral and non-neutral economies. Output
response is 50.6% larger in the revenue neutral economy.
Second, we show that systematic shifts in the revenue distribution introduce a
counter-cyclical force to the real effect of monetary policy. Because revenue is greater
during high output states, and more so for high revenue products, the price response
to a monetary shock is larger during expansions. The size of this effect is modest,
as the cumulative effect of monetary policy on output increases by 8.6% during re-
cessions through this mechanism in our model. When we include counter-cyclical
results suggest a direct relationship between revenue and price adjustment at the product level that
holds both in the cross-section of products and across time.
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volatility shocks, the mechanism that Vavra (2014) finds generates pro-cyclical ef-
fects, the two forces cancel out and the magnitude of the real effect of monetary
policy is invariant across the business cycle.
In contrast to our results, many price setting models make assumptions that
enforce revenue neutrality in the price setting problem. In time-dependent models,
such as standard New Keynesian Calvo pricing or Rotemberg pricing models, price
setting decisions are revenue neutral. The timing of price changes is exogenous to
the firm, and desired prices are functions of only current and future marginal costs
and other aggregates.
Many recent papers with state-dependent pricing also assume revenue neutrality,
mostly to facilitate analytical tractability or computation. For example, Gertler and
Leahy (2008) assume that the menu costs scale with firm size in order to derive
analytical expressions for a dynamic Phillips curve. Alvarez and Lippi (2014) and
Alvarez et al. (2016) directly assume that firm loss from sub-optimal prices depends
only on the price gap, which allows them to derive analytical solutions. Midrigan
(2011), on the other hand, assumes that idiosyncratic demand shocks exactly offset
productivity shocks such that revenue is normalized to reduce the computational
burden of solving his model. However, as our paper shows, the treatment of product
revenue has important implications for both price setting behavior, both at the mi-
croeconomic level and for the real effect of monetary policy at the macroeconomic
level, casting doubt as to whether the assumption of revenue neutrality is truly in-
nocuous.
The heterogeneous price response that the non-neutrality of revenue entails has
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several substantive implications. First, heterogeneity in the response of prices across
products offers insight into the nature of menu costs and the monetary policy trans-
mission mechanism. For example, our findings suggest that smaller firms with low
revenue products are less willing to adjust their prices due to comparably large ad-
justment costs. This may explain why small firms fail to be well informed about
aggregate inflation and monetary policy (Kumar et al. 2015) and suggest that mon-
etary policy works largely through small firms and low revenue products rather then
through high revenue firms. As such, understanding hetrogenities in the transmission
of monetary policy can be integral to optimal policy design.
Furthermore, the heterogeneity in the response of prices across products of vary-
ing revenues can have distributional consequences. For example, Cravino et al.(2020)
show that high income households consumer price indices are one-third less re-
sponsive to monetary policy than those of middle-income households. Kaplan and
Schulhofer-Wohl (2017) find large cross-sectional dispersion in the household inflation
rate stemming mostly from variation in prices paid for the same types of goods. Our
results provide a potential mechanism behind these findings, through the variation
in products and stores different households frequent.
Lastly, heterogeneity in the policy responsiveness of prices across products has
important consequences for our understanding of monetary non-neutrality. For ex-
ample, Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) find that accounting for heterogeneity in the
frequency and median size of price adjustment across different sectors of the econ-
omy increases the degree of monetary non-neutrality in menu cost models.3 Alvarez
3Carvalho (2006) finds that in Calvo models the degree of monetary non-neutrality is convex in
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et al. (2016) argue that the ratio of kurtosis to the frequency of price changes is a
sufficient statistic for the real effect of monetary shocks. However, accounting for
revenue non-neutrality in each of these analyses may alter their conclusions. The
sizable differences in the responsiveness of aggregate output between revenue neutral
and non-neutral economies imply that accounting for the effect of revenue on price
setting and matching the revenue distribution is vital to understanding the degree
of monetary non-neutrality. Additionally, heterogeneity in individual responses can
have an effect on the degree of state-dependence of the aggregate response to a shock.
Our work contributes to a growing literature on the heterogeneous effects and
distributional consequences of monetary policy. For example Beraja et al. (2018)
find regional heterogeneity in monetary policy effects due to variation in the levels
of housing equity. Additionally, Wong(2019) finds heterogeneous effects of policy
across the life-cycle due to the differing exposure to mortgage rates. Auclert (2019)
documents heterogeneity in earnings, balance sheet exposure, and interest rate ex-
posure and their effect on monetary policy transmission. Coibion et al.(2017) show
that monetary policy shocks have contributed to the historical volatility of income
and consumption inequality in the United States.
This paper is also closely related to the large literature using microdata to evaluate
price changes pioneered by Bils and Klenow (2004), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008),
the frequency of price change and thus heterogeneity in the frequency of price adjustment through
the Calvo parameter increases the degree of monetary non-neutrality relative to those calibrated
to the average frequency of price change. Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) find that in menu cost
models this result depends on the underlying differences that cause the heterogeneity. In their
model, the effect is in particular reliant on the relationship between the frequency and size of price
changes across sectors.
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and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008). Various papers, such as Golsov and Lucas (2007)
and Midrigan (2011), have shown that accurately reflecting price setting behavior
as documented in the empirical literature has important implications monetary non-
neutrality.4 Our paper adds to this literature by studying the relationship between
product revenue and price setting behavior.
A number of papers have pointed out that firms with multiple products appear
to make pricing decisions based on the totality of their products. For example, Lach
and Tsiddon (1996, 2007) provide evidence showing synchronization of price changes
within a given firm, and Bhattarai and Schoenle (2014) find that firms selling more
goods adjust their prices more frequently and by smaller amounts. On the theoretical
side, Midrigan (2011) and Alvarez and Lippi (2014) have shown that accounting for
multi-product firms would, in general, increase aggregate price stickiness. While our
paper focuses on a single product setting, the general results of our paper are comple-
mentary with this line of work. Incorporating our findings into a multi-product firm
environment would be straightforward. Firms would simply consider the revenue of
the totality of their products in their pricing decisions, and our main thesis would
remain unaltered.
Our results regarding the state-dependence of monetary policy are closely related
to Vavra (2014). Vavra finds that the average frequency of price adjustment and the
cross-sectional standard deviation of the size of price changes are counter-cyclical. He
4Other papers that study the relationship between price setting behavior at the micro-level and
aggregate fluctuations include Alvarez and Lippi (2014), Alvarez et al. (2016), Burstein and Hellwig
(2007), Caballero and Engel (2007), Caplin and Spulber (1987), Gertler and Leahy (2008), Midrigan
and Kehoe (2015), and Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) among others.
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argues that, if this is driven by volatility shocks to idiosyncratic productivity, the real
effects of monetary policy will be weaker in recessions. However, state dependence
of the effects of monetary policy is not a settled issue. For example, in contrast,
Santoro et al. (2014) show that loss aversion can imply stronger monetary policy
transmission in recessions.
In Section 2.2 we derive the relationship between product revenue and price setting
behavior and monetary policy using a simple analytical framework. In Section 2.3, we
test these relationships empirically. In Section, 2.4 we use a quantitative menu cost
model to demonstrate the implications of our results on the real effect of monetary
policy. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Revenue And Price Setting
In this section, we present our framework in which we derive the relationship
between product revenue and the price setting behavior of firms. We illustrate our
point using a static menu cost problem of a firm. This allows us to demonstrate the
mechanism behind why revenue matters in a clear and analytically tractable way.
We present expressions that describe the relationship between price setting behavior
and product revenue that can be tested empirically. We derive expressions for the
implications of these relationships for monetary policy transmission.
2.2.1 Analytical Results
We first solve the firm’s price setting problem to demonstrate the relationship
between revenue and price setting. Consider a static problem of a firm with constant
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marginal cost facing a demand curve with constant elasticity of demand ε. To derive
the optimal price, the firm solves the following problem,
max
p
π(p) = (p−mc)y(p) (2.1)
where p is the firm’s price, mc is its marginal cost, and y(p) is the demand schedule





A second order approximation of the profit function π around p∗ yields,







= (1 − ε)(y(p
∗)
p∗
). We can then express the loss of a firm from having
suboptimal price p as




(p− p∗)2 > 0.
Suppose that the firm inherits some price p and the firm must pay a small menu
cost in order to change its price. In order to demonstrate the role of revenue in price
setting, we allow the menu cost to be a function of the firm’s optimal desired revenue
rev∗ ≡ p∗y(p∗). Given rev∗, a firm will choose to change its price only if the loss
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around zero, we can solve for the inaction region of the firm to get,
∣∣∣lnp− lnp∗∣∣∣ <√ 2b(rev∗)
(ε− 1)rev∗
. (2.3)
If the firm’s inherited price p is adequately close to its desired price p∗ as described
by equation (2.3), the firm will not change its price. The range of inaction, expressed
as percent deviations from the optimal price, is a function of desired revenue rev∗.5
For analytical tractability we assume that the menu cost has the functional form
b̄ · (rev∗)k where b̄ is some constant. This functional form assumption allows us to
parsimoniously capture the relationship between revenue and price setting with one
scaling parameter k. If k > 1, the menu cost of the firm increases at a rate faster then
revenue, and the inaction region grows larger as revenue increases. With k < 1 the
opposite is true. If k = 1, the menu cost is fixed in relation to revenue and revenue
drops out of equation (2.3). Thus revenue plays no role in determining whether firms
adjust their price and is neutral if k = 1.
We denote the price gap between the inherited and optimal price of the firm as
x ≡ lnp − lnp∗. Suppose that the probability distribution of this price gap over
5In addition, the inaction zone decreases with the elasticity of demand and is increasing in menu
costs.
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time follows the distribution F (x).6 Then, we can derive the expressions for the
probability of price adjustment and expected absolute size of adjustment conditional
on change as,












where prob(rev∗) is the probability of adjustment conditional on revenue and size(rev∗)
is the expected absolute size of adjustment conditional on revenue. ζ(rev∗) =√
2b̄·(rev∗)k−1
(ε−1) is the distance between the optimal price to the edges of the inaction
region. We can derive the relationship between these two statistics and log revenue
















The sign of equation (2.6) is determined by the parameter k. If k > 1, it is less
than zero and if k < 1, it is greater then zero. If k = 0 equation (2.6) is exactly
zero. The sign of equation (2.7) is also determined by k. The sign of equation
6We assume that the distribution F is independent of the firm’s revenue. This assumption is
not exactly true, most notably due to our claim that product revenue directly affects price setting
decisions. However, our assumption of independence can be thought of as assuming that the indirect
effects through differences in the distribution of price gaps across revenue is small compared to the
direct effect through the movements in the inaction region. Our numerical simulations from the
dynamic quantitative model in Section 2.4 support this assumption.
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(2.7) is opposite that of equation (2.6) because size(rev∗) is greater than ζ(rev∗) by
construction. This is always true unless k = 1, in which case equation (2.7) should
also equal zero.
The sign of the relationships in equation (2.6) and (2.7) can be verified empirically.
Notice that while the expressions depend on revenue, their signs do not. Because
the signs are unchanged by revenue, the sign of the weighted average of these ex-







g(rev∗)drev∗, where g(rev∗) is the den-
sity of the cross-sectional revenue distribution, will allow us to determine whether
revenue variation matters for the price setting problem.
Recall that the price setting problem is revenue neutral only if k = 1, which






are zero. In Section




g(rev∗)drev∗ is positive, and∫ (∂size(rev∗)
∂ln(rev∗)
)
g(rev∗)drev∗ is negative, consistent with k < 1. This suggests that
menu costs are relatively fixed in proportion to product revenue.
This result is consistent with studies that attempt to measure menu costs directly.
For example, Zbaracki et al. (2004) show that the managerial cost of price adjustment
which, presumably, is relatively fixed in proportion to revenue, is 6 times larger than
the physical cost for a U.S. industrial manufacturer.7 Levy et al. (1997), measure
the physical costs of changing prices for a U.S. supermarket chain. They find that
most of their costs are fixed costs, such as the cost of preparing and changing a shelf
7They also find that costs of informing and negotiating with customers are even greater, ap-
proximately 20 times larger than physical costs. The relevance of customer costs in our setting,
however, is less clear as the price of retail items are generally non-negotiable.
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price tag, verification costs, and supervision costs.
2.2.2 Monetary Policy Transmission
We now derive a testable prediction for relationship between product revenue and
the degree of responsiveness of prices to a monetary shock. Building on the previous
section, suppose that firms now face a monetary policy shock ∆m. Let lnp∗ and
lnp̂∗ denote respectively, the desired price of the firm before and after the monetary
shock. As in Caballero and Engel (2007), the desired optimal price of individual
firms changes as follows:8
∆lnp∗ = lnp̂∗ − lnp∗ = ∆m. (2.8)
Denote x ≡ lnp − lnp∗ and x̂ ≡ lnp − lnp̂∗ as the price gap before and after the
monetary shock. Then, the price gap after the monetary shock is,
x̂ = x−∆m.
The expected price response for a firm with a given level of revenue F(rev∗), is
defined as the expected percent change in price as a ratio of the monetary shock, to
8This equation is analogous to Caballero and Engel’s (2007) specification on pg.112. The id-
iosyncratic shocks often utilized to generate price adjustments are abstracted into the distribution
of price gaps F . Equation (2.8) is consistent with many menu cost models such as the quantitative
dynamic model in Section 2.4.
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Equation (2.9) can be expressed as the expected sum of price changes for prices










Price adjustment is zero for inherited prices inside the inaction bands, while the price
change for firms outside the inaction bands is equal to the negative of the price gap
−x̂ = −(x −∆m). In addition, the inaction bands themselves adjust in relation to
the original distribution of price gaps f(x) in response to the monetary shock.
We derive the explicit expression for equation (2.9) from equation (2.10) by differ-
entiating equation (2.10) with regard to ∆m and taking the limit of ∆m to zero. The
expression for the expected price response to an arbitrarily small monetary shock is
as follows:
F(rev∗) = A(rev∗) + E(rev∗)
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where
A(rev∗) = F (−ζ(rev∗)) + (1− F (ζ(rev∗))) = prob(rev∗) (2.11)






A(rev∗) is the intensive margin component and E(rev∗) the extensive margin com-
ponent of the price response.
As defined by Caballero and Engel (2007), the intensive margin refers to the
increase in the size of price changes of firms that would have adjusted anyway, with or
without the shock. The expression for the intensive margin is equal to the probability
of adjustment given in equation (2.4), as originally shown by Caballero and Engel.
This is because the price change induced by the monetary shock for firms that adjust
with or without the shock is equal to the size of the shock, so the expected price
response is determined by the probability of adjustment.
The extensive margin captures the price change from firms whose adjustment is
triggered by the monetary shock. This applies to firms that lie at the edges of the
inaction bands. While the probability of being at the edge of the inaction region
is small, the size of price change for triggered firms is large. Hence the extensive
margin effect can be potentially large. We find that the expression for the extensive
margin is equal to the coefficient measuring the relationship between the probability
of adjustment and product revenue given in equation (2.6), multiplied by a factor of
2
1−k . This expression for the extensive margin is new to this paper.
9
9We note that the quantitative magnitude of the extensive margin has been a point of contention
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We derive the relationship between product revenue and price response by taking
derivatives ofA, E , and F with respect to log revenue. First, one can see the following







Thus, the relationship between the intensive margin and product revenue is equal to
that of the relationship between the probability of adjustment and revenue. This is
because as revenue increases the probability of adjustment increases and the addi-
tional firms that adjust through the intensive margin effect do so by the size of the
monetary shock.
























in the literature. While much effort has been devoted to measuring the size of the extensive margin
effect using indirect methods (for example Luo and Villar, 2017, Alvarez et al., 2016), the difficulty
in direct measurement has prolonged the debate. Our framework sheds new light on this debate.
In Section 2.3, we provide estimates for the revenue weighted average of ∂prob(rev
∗)
∂ln(rev∗) across firms in
the range of 0.011 ∼ 0.024. In Appendix B, we estimate the value of k = 0.301, using a parametric
model based on the theoretical analysis. The average frequency of adjustment in our sample is
6.7%. These estimates suggest that the extensive margin component of price response is roughly
between half to the full size of the intensive margin component. This result aligns more closely with
the smaller values suggested by Midrigan (2011) and Alvarez et al. (2016) than the larger values
suggested by Golosov and Lucas (2007) and Vavra (2014).
65
The intuition behind this result is as follows. As revenue increases the inaction
bands move closer to the desired price and the marginal firms that are triggered
by the monetary shock adjust by a smaller amount, decreasing the price response.









represents the change in the density of firms at the edges of
the inaction band. If f ′ is negative, as is often the case, then the expected price






is the scaling factor.
Then, the relationship between the response of prices to monetary policy and












The negative effect in the expression for the extensive margin cancels out with the
intensive margin, and only the distributional effect of the extensive margin remains.
Thus, equation (2.16) suggests that the relationship between the response of prices
to monetary policy and revenue has the same sign as the relationship between prob-
ability of adjustment and revenue as long as f is downward sloping (f ′ is negative)
as one moves further away from the desired price.
Our findings suggest that it is important to verify the role of revenue variation
in the price setting problem. Not only does revenue variation play a critical role for
microeconomic price setting behavior, important macroeconomic implications are
determined by the presence of revenue variation in the price setting problem as well.
If revenue is non-neutral (k < 1), products with higher levels of revenue are likely to
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be more responsive to monetary policy. This implies cross-sectional heterogeneity in
the response to monetary policy.
It also suggests that the response of the aggregate price will be larger if revenue
is non-neutral compared to the neutral case. Conversely, the response of output will
be smaller with non-neutrality. This is due to the fact that high revenue products
that are more heavily weighted in the determination of the aggregate price will be
more responsive to monetary shocks. This may be partially offset but the decrease
in the responsiveness of low revenue products, but low revenue products constitute
only a small fraction of the aggregate price. Therefore, it maybe necessary to incor-
porate revenue non-neutrality into models that attempt to quantify the magnitude
of monetary transmission.
Our results also imply that changes in the revenue distribution over the business
cycle may lead to state-dependence in monetary policy transmission. With non-
neutrality, the level and variance of the revenue distribution play a critical role in
the transmission of monetary policy. The variance matters because an increase in the
variance of the revenue distribution will increase the aggregate price response due to
the fact that high revenue products are more heavily weighted in the determination
of the aggregate price.
We believe that the results of Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 are robust to various exten-
sions, for example accounting for multi-product firms. In Appendix B, we re-derive
the equations for the case where firms are subject to exogenous adjustment hazards in
addition to the menu cost mechanism. As long as the exogenous adjustment hazard
itself is not a function of product revenue, the equations governing the relationships
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between product revenue and price setting do not change. In the example of multi-
product firms, unless there is a systematic relationship between a product’s revenue
and the number of products offered by it’s price setter across time, our results would
remain robust.
While we believe that our results from a static framework are excellent approxi-
mations of a fully dynamic model, we verify our theoretical results within a dynamic
framework.10 The same applies to the assumption that the effect of revenue on the
distribution of price gaps do not alter our results. In Section 2.4, we utilize a quan-
titative dynamic general equilibrium menu cost model to generate the relationships
between revenue, price setting, and monetary policy transmission for values of k
consistent with our empirical findings and compare the results with a model where
revenue neutrality holds. We find that the theoretical analysis of this section holds
up well in a fully dynamic model.
2.3 Evidence On Revenue And Price Setting
In this section, we test our theoretical predictions regarding the relationship be-
tween price setting and revenue. We present empirical evidence showing that (1) the
probability of price adjustment increases with revenue and that (2) the average size
of price adjustment is decreasing in revenue. We also present evidence showing that
10Elsby and Michaels (2019) show that with small menu costs and two sided adjustment, optimal
policy triggers of the static problem are close approximations of the dynamic problem. Dixit (1991),
Alvarez and Lippi (2014), and Alvarez et al. (2016) derive optimal policy triggers in a dynamic
model, although with limited equilibrium interactions. Their solutions add a multiplicative term
to our expression for the inaction region, proportional to the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks.
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(3) the responsiveness of prices to a monetary shock is increasing in product revenue.
2.3.1 Data
We use retail scanner data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC and marketing
databases provided by the Kilts Center for Marketing Data Center at The University
of Chicago Booth School of Business. The scanner dataset includes information on
weekly prices, quantities sold, and various product and store characteristics beginning
in the year 2006. Over 90 retail chains across all US markets participate in providing
information on over 2.6 million UPCs,11 1,100 product categories and 125 product
groups. The entire data set covers over half of the total sales volume of US grocery
and drug stores and above 30 percent of all US mass merchandiser sales volume.
The dataset is large with over a hundred billion observations, making it compu-
tationally intractable to use in its entirety. For this reason, we randomly choose a
sample of 30 product categories and 34 markets on which we conduct most of our
analysis.12 Nevertheless, even when using this subset of the available data, our cover-
age of products and markets is comparable and often greater than most studies that
utilize retail scanner data. Our sample covers 18,612 different stores, 76 different
retail chains and 31,746 different UPCs.
As is standard in studies using micro price data, we focus on “regular” prices and
11A UPC (Universal Product Code) is a unique identification number assigned to a retail item.
12A product category is a finely defined subset of products defined by The Nielsen Company.
Examples include canned tuna, canned fruit and household cleaners. A market is a designated
market area defined by The Nielsen Company, which correspond approximately to a metropolitan
statistical area (MSA). The full list of product categories and markets in our sample is provided in
Appendix B.
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price changes, excluding temporary sales. Since not all sales are directly flagged in
our dataset, we use the algorithm developed by Midrigan (2011) and Midrigan and
Kehoe (2015) to compute regular prices. We compute the regular price as the modal
price in an 11-week window surrounding a particular week provided the modal price
is used sufficiently often.13 We define a price change as any change in regular price
greater than 1% in magnitude.
Our primary unit of analysis is a product. We define a “product,” as a unique
UPC-retailer-market combination. Thus, a two-liter bottle of Coca Cola from a
retailer sold in the New York market would be considered a separate product from
a two-liter bottle of Coca Cola sold in LA by the same retailer. For some products,
there can be large random swings in revenue from week to week and occasionally
there will zero sales over a week. To address these concerns, we aggregate the data
up to monthly frequency. We thus compute product revenue as the total sales of
each UPC each month within a market for each retailer. This aggregation has the
added benefit of easier comparison of our results to previous studies of price setting
behavior, which are usually conducted at monthly frequency.14
As our definition of a product indicates, we treat price setting decisions as being
made at the retailer-market level for each UPC item separately. While we find some
13A detailed description of the algorithm we use to compute regular prices can be found in the
appendix of Midrigan (2011).
14Several papers have noted that changes in price within a week can cause spurious dispersion
in prices. We believe that we are tracking economically relevant changes in prices and revenue
and not statistical artifacts of data collection because we exclude small price changes and disregard
temporary price changes. In addition aggregation of changes to the monthly level also helps mitigate
the effect of spurious changes.
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variation in the timing of price changes within the UPC-retailer-market, i.e. at the
store level, much of the variation is between retailers and markets. Additionally,
DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2019) find that most of the variation in price levels is
between retailers, rather than between stores within a retailer.
Figure 2.1 supports this decision. These histograms depict the degree of synchro-
nization of price changes within different units of analysis. In Panel (a) of Figure 2.1,
the X-axis represents the fraction of UPC-store combinations within a UPC-retailer-
market that change their price during a given month. They are conditioned on at
least one store changing their price. Panel (a) suggests that within a market, either
all the stores of a given retailer change their price simultaneously (with a frequency
of 5.2%) or that very few stores change their price. In only a small fraction of cases,
does a relatively large portion of stores change their price while simultaneously a
large fraction of stores does not change their price.
Panel (b) shows the fraction of price changes of UPC-store combinations within
a UPC-retailer at the national level. It shows that the degree of synchronization
of price changes is much lower at the national level. This is mostly easily seen by
the fact that the fraction of cases where all stores simultaneously change their price
drops by almost half to 2.7%. There seems to be considerable variation in price
adjustment across markets within retailers. Panel (c) shows the fraction of stores
for each product across retailers that are changing at the same time. If we look
at the fraction of UPC-store combinations that change price within a UPC without
considering variation in retailers, the mass of stores at unity all but disappears.
The evidence from Figure 2.1 suggests that much of the decision making for
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price adjustment is done at the UPC-retailer-market level. Therefore, for the main
empirical results in this paper, we consider the UPC-retailer-market combination
to be the unit of analysis. Aggregation to UPC-retailer-markets from UPC-stores
removes some concern about measurement error at the expense of some variation.
However, we include variation across markets, as we find considerable variation across
markets in contrast to DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2019) who find little for price levels.
After aggregation we have 18 million observations of UPC-retailer-market-months,
an average of 150 thousand observations a month.
In Table 2.1 we provide some summary statistics of our sample given the aggre-
gation described above. The average frequency of adjustment in our sample is 6.7
percent. The average absolute size of price adjustment conditional on adjustment
is 14.8 percent and the median adjustment size is 10.4 percent. These statistics are
comparable to other studies using retail scanner data such as Coibion et al. (2015)
who find an average frequency of price change of 5.4 percent and absolute size of
change of approximately 12 percent. The average revenue of a product in our sample
is 1,230.85 dollars, with revenue ranging from 2.12 dollars for the lowest revenue
products (1st percentile) to 16,863.32 dollars for the highest revenue products (99th
percentile) per product retailer month.
In Table 2.2 we report some statistics on the number of products and stores per
retailer-market. We have between 52 (10th percentile) and 868 (90th percentile)
products per retailer-market suggesting a wide range of types of retailers, from small
mom-and-pop types to large box store chains. Retailers have between 2 and 108
stores in each market. This is driven both by the size of the market (New York City
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versus Bangor, Maine), and the penetration of a given retailer in each market.
2.3.2 Empirical Results
We first test the relationship that product revenue has with both the probability
and size of price changes. These relationships correspond to equations (2.6) and (2.7)
of the previous section. Figure 2.2 summarizes our main findings. Panel (a) depicts
the relationship between revenue and the probability of price adjustment in our sam-
ple. We compute the average monthly revenue of each product and group them into
percentile bins by their revenue. We then compute the average probability of price
adjustment and the average log revenue within each bin and plot this relationship.
Panel (a) clearly shows a strong positive relationship between revenue and the prob-
ability of price adjustment. For example, a product in the tenth percentile of average
revenue has a probability of adjustment of less then 1 percent, while a product at the
ninetieth percentile has a probability of adjustment close to 15 percent per month.
Panel (b) depicts the relationship between revenue and the absolute size of price
adjustment. It shows the average absolute size of adjustment and the average log
revenue for each percentile bin. The figure shows a clear negative relationship be-
tween revenue and size of adjustment. The average size of adjustment for a product
in the tenth percentile of average revenue is approximately 18 percent, while the
average size of adjustment for a product at the ninetieth percentile is approximately
11 percent.
These figures report the averages of pricing behavior conditional on revenue, com-
paring across time as well as retailers, product categories, and markets. Although
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this simple exercise illustrates a very strong relationship, we proceed to test the
robustness of the relationship controlling for various factors. We show in the next
section that the relationships remain strong even as we add controls to mitigate
potential concerns.
2.3.2.1 Revenue And Probability Of Price Adjustment
The variable adjijmt represents the observed revenue-weighted price adjustment
for each UPC-retailer-market. This variable is the fraction of the revenue in stores
that a price change is observed over the total revenue, for a given UPC i, of retailer
j, in market m, during month t. Because of a high degree of correlation between
price changes across stores for a given retailer this variable is often near one or zero.
We estimate the relationship between this variable and lagged log revenue using the
regression equation,
adjijmt = α + βlogrevijmt−1 + εijmt (2.17)
where logrevijmt−1 is the log revenue of UPC i, of retailer j, in market m, during
month t − 1.15 Because price changes in a given month can directly affect revenue
in that month, we use lagged rather than current revenue.16 Depending on the spec-
ification, we include a number of fixed effects to address various concerns. Finally,
15Because we are concerned about changes in regular price, there may be some concern about
how to treat revenue in weeks the product is on sale. Throughout the paper we use the average
weekly revenue of a product in a given month, and multiply that number by four weeks to compute
the monthly revenue. Alternatively, we have also tried using the average of weekly revenue of a
product in weeks when the product is not on sale multiplied by four weeks for monthly revenue and
found similar results (not reported).
16Regression with current log revenue give similar results (not reported).
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we include a instrumental variables regression specification. Standard errors in all
specifications are clustered on month, retailer and UPC separately, in order to allevi-
ate concerns about correlation in consumer preferences within localities or products,
retailer policy, UPC characteristics, and macroeconomic shocks.
We report the results in Table 2.3. These results confirm our earlier findings in
Figure 2.2. Column (1) includes the month fixed effect to mitigate concerns about
spurious correlations with long-term trends such as inflation and growth. Addition-
ally, this should mitigate the effects of product entry and exit. In column (2), we add
market, retailer, and UPC fixed effects separately to rule out the possibility that the
relationship is driven by these differences. Column (3) includes UPC-retailer-market
fixed effects (these are fixed effects at the product level as we have defined them).
This eliminates the cross-sectional variation across products, and ensures the rela-
tionship is driven by variation across time. The remaining variation is across time
for the same product, further alleviating concerns about unobserved factors driving
the relationship between price adjustment and product revenue.
The various fixed effects alleviate concerns that unobserved factors may affect
price adjustment and product revenue simultaneously. For example, several papers,
including Bhattarai and Schoenle (2014), have documented that firms that sell more
products are more likely to change the prices of each product. Then, because firms
with more products may be more likely to have products with higher average revenue,
one may worry that multi-product firms, not revenue, is actually driving our results.
However, by removing variation at both the UPC and retailer level with fixed effects,
we control for the extra returns to scope that multi-product firms experience in
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changing several prices at once. Our findings are complementary but separate.
In Column (4), we instrument logrevijmt−1 using the log of the total revenue for
UPC i in period t− 1, summing across all retailers in market m except for retailer j.
We believe this instrument contains information regarding local demand that only
affects price setting behavior through its effect on product revenue. Our preferred
interpretation is that the revenue of UPC i in other retailers of the same market
reflect the local change in the underlying preferences for UPC i. For example, this
interpretation is consistent with standard monopolistic competition models with con-
stant elasticity of substitution consumption aggregators and idiosyncratic preference
shocks.
The coefficient on log revenue β is positive across all of our specifications. Addi-
tionally the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level for all specifications
and also large economically. The coefficient of 0.0139 in column (1) suggests that a
10% increase in revenue increases price adjustment by 0.14 percentage points, which
is approximately 2% of the average frequency of price adjustment in our sample.
The coefficient remains quite stable across specifications, even as we include various
fixed effects. The difference between the highest revenue goods (99th percentile) and
lowest revenue goods (1st percentile) in our sample is approximately 9 log units,
implying that the probability of a price change for the highest revenue products is
about 12.5 percentage points higher for than products with the lowest revenue. In
column (4) the first stage has an F-stat of 186.0 suggesting that our instrument is
highly relevant. The instrumental variable specification, which includes the UPC-
retailer-market fixed effects, has a very similar coefficient to that in column (1) but
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wider confidence intervals.
We also consider an alternative specification, in which we construct a binary
variable Dijmt that takes the value of one if the revenue-weighted percentage of
prices that changed for UPC i, in retailer j, in market m, in month t, is greater
than 17.6%.17 This is a linear probability model with the positive outcome defined
as a coordinated price change. This allows us to interpret the coefficient on lagged
log revenue as the marginal effect of increasing log revenue on the probability of
adjustment. We regress,
Dijmt = α + βlogrevijmt−1 + εijmt. (2.18)
As before, we include specifications with month, market, retailer, UPC, and UPC-
retailer-market fixed effects. We also include the instrumental variables specification
using, as before, the log of the total revenue of the UPC in all other retailers of that
market. The results are reported in Table 2.4.
The coefficient on log revenue β is positive across all specifications. The coeffi-
cient of 0.0236 in column (1) suggests that a 10% increase in revenue increases the
probability of price adjustment by 0.24 percentage points, which is approximately
4% of the average probability of price adjustment. The coefficient, again, remains
quite stable across specifications. The results are statistically significant at the 1%
level for all specifications and again large economically. The implied difference in
the probability of price change between the highest and lowest revenue products is
17We choose a cutoff value of 17.6% of revenue because it is the median percentage of revenue
from stores that change, conditional on at least one store changing price in that market for a retailer.
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approximately 21 percentage points.
2.3.2.2 Revenue And Size Of Price Adjustment
We also test for the relationship between revenue and the absolute size of price
adjustment conditional on price adjustment. We construct the revenue-weighted
absolute size of price adjustment variable |∆pijmt| as follows. We first compute the
changes in regular price week to week in each store for each UPC i, of retailer j,
in market m, during month t. We keep changes larger than 1%. Then, we weight
by each store’s share of revenue among stores in a given retailer with observed price
changes during the given month, and average the regular price changes in percentage
terms.18 We estimate,
|∆pijt| = αt + βlogrevijt−1 + εijt. (2.19)
The coefficient β represents the expected increase in the size of adjustment given
an increase in log revenue. As before, we cluster on month, retailer, and UPC.
Additionally, we add specifications that include market, retailer, and UPC fixed
effects separately. We include a specification that has a UPC-retailer-market fixed
effect, which removes all variation between products that does not differ across time.
Finally, we include the instrumental variables specification using the log of the total
revenue of the UPC in all other retailers of that market as an instrument.
Table 2.5 shows the results. We find that the relationship between the size of price
18If a store changed regular price twice in a month each observation counts towards the average.
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adjustment and revenue is negative and statistically significant across all specifica-
tions. From column (1), a coefficient of -0.0106 indicates that the average absolute
size of price change will decrease by 0.11 percentage points when revenue increases
by 10%. This is approximately 1.2% of the average size of adjustment in our sample.
The implied difference in the average size of adjustment between the highest and
lowest revenue products is approximately 10 percentage points.
In Table 2.5, the coefficient on log revenue decreases across specifications as we
include more fixed effects. We believe that this is due to attenuation bias from
measurement error. The R-squared increases from 0.018 in the first column to 0.458
in the third column, as the absolute size of the coefficient decreases from -0.0106 to
-0.0044. This suggests that the fixed effects soak up much of the variation in the
dependent variable as we add each one to the regression. As long as the measurement
error is uncorrelated noise, its variance is less affected by the fixed effects than the
true variation in revenue.19 Our instrumental variable specification should alleviate
classical measurement problems, which appears to be borne out by our results.
Nevertheless, the sign and the statistical significance of the results are stable
19This effect appears to be especially relevant for regression equation (2.19) compared to regres-
sion equations (2.17) and (2.18) due to the differences in the group sizes we use in estimation. While
we utilize all observations of revenue and price to estimate the probability of adjustment, we only
use observations for which there are price changes to estimate equation (2.19). Once we control
for UPC-retailer-market fixed effects, we are left only with the within product variation in the size
of price changes. Price adjustment is relatively infrequent and we are left with little variation in
the independent variable to accurately estimate column (3) of Table 2.19. For example, imagine a
product for which we have 5 years of monthly observations, and the price of the product adjusts
6 times during that span. Then for regression equation (2.17) we would have 60 observations,
whereas for equation (2.19) we would only have 6 observations. As the result in column (1) is the
least susceptible to attenuation bias and most consistent with Figure 2.2b, we use this estimate to
calibrate our model in Section 2.4.
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across all specifications, strongly suggesting a robust negative relationship which is
consistent with our theoretical predictions. Considering the results of Tables 2.3, 2.4,
and 2.5, we conclude that there is a fundamental relationship between revenue and
price adjustment that cannot be attributed to systematic differences across UPCs,
retailers, markets or any other time invariant product characteristics. We also believe
that it is unlikely that an unobserved variable would cause fluctuations in product
revenue over time, while simultaneously increasing the probability of price change
and decreasing the size of price changes in relation to revenue. Finally, we believe that
our instrumental variable specifications show that changes to price setting behavior
is indeed induced by the movements in the revenue of the product and not by other
factors.
Estimation equations (2.17), (2.18), and (2.19) are the empirical counterparts to
a weighted sum across products of equations (2.6) and (2.7). The signs of these
theoretical derivations do not change with product level characteristics, and thus
a weighted average of these expressions will be equal to the sign of the individual
equations. We conclude that in the context of the theory developed in Section 2.2
that k < 1 and that revenue is non-neutral.
2.3.2.3 Revenue And Monetary Policy Transmission
In this section, we estimate the responsive of prices to a monetary policy shock.
Our theoretical results in Section 2.2.2 and the empirical results in the previous
section suggest that the responsiveness of prices will be larger for products with
higher revenue. We use monetary shocks constructed from high frequency data of
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current month federal fund futures on Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
announcement dates. We use the federal fund surprises constructed by Paul (2019)
from 2006-2015,20 which we augment to include shocks from unscheduled meetings
from January 2008 to December 2009 from Gorodnichenko and Weber (2012).21
Using local projections on the panel of price changes, we estimate the impulse
response of prices to a monetary policy shock by each quantile of revenue. We group
products into revenue quantiles by sorting products by revenue within each market,
and assign the lowest 20% of products into quantile 1, the next 20% into quantile
2 and so forth. We do this within each market month. We estimate the following
equation for 18 periods:22
∆lnpq,t = αq + βq,h ∗∆mt−h + εq,t−h. (2.20)
We construct cumulative responses by summing across coefficients up to a given
horizon.23 Figure 2.3 shows the impulse response of price levels for each quantile of
revenue in response to an unexpected increase of 100 basis points in the federal funds
20Paul (2019) documents that an unexpected increase in the federal funds rate leads to a fall in
aggregate prices and output as should be expected.
21We also report results using shocks without the unscheduled meetings in Appendix B. The
results are similar but with larger confidence intervals.
22Our sample of price changes runs from January 2006 to December 2015. For the monetary
shocks we use information as far back as July 2004. This ensures that the price response variable
are all from a common time period for all horizons, while simultaneously utilizing all observations
regarding price responses.
23The individual coefficients βq,h are reported in Appendix B.
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rate. Each panel shows the price response of products in each quantile, and the one
standard deviation and 90% confidence intervals by order of quantile.24 The prices
of products in the lowest revenue quantile respond the least, and show very little
adjustment to a monetary shock. The prices of the highest revenue quantile respond
the most. The magnitude of the cumulative response of prices following a monetary
shock increases with each revenue quantile at horizons over a year. The impulse
response functions are significantly different from zero for all quantiles at such hori-
zons. In addition, the 90% confidence intervals of the lowest quantile products and
that of the highest quantile products do not overlap at various points past the 12
month mark, suggesting that the difference is statistically significant. We perform a
Welch’s t-test of the null hypothesis that the (cumulative) impulse response for the
fifth quantile is not greater than the response for the first quantile after 12 months,
based on simulated standard errors. A single sided test rejects the null hypothesis
with a p-value of less than 1%.
Our results suggest that the response of prices to a monetary shock is increasing
in revenue. The cumulative response of the point estimates suggest that the response
of prices of products in the lowest quantile of revenue is 19% of the response of prices
for products in the highest quantile of revenue over 12 months and 26% over 18
months.
Our empirical results support our theoretical results in Section 2.2. They demon-
strate the importance of product revenue for not only price setting behavior at the
24We show one standard deviation and 90% confidence intervals based on a Monte Carlo sim-
ulations where we draw a coefficient at each horizon from its limiting distribution. We use 2000
separate draws for each confidence interval.
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micro level, but also for the real effect of monetary policy. In Section 2.4, we ex-
plore the aggregate implications of our theoretical and empirical findings. However,
before exploring the aggregate implications, we first document the business cycle
movements of the cross-sectional distribution of revenue across products, as busi-
ness cycle movements in the revenue distribution can potentially interact with price
responsiveness in an meaningful way.
2.3.2.4 Revenue Distribution And Unemployment
To study the interaction between price setting decisions and the revenue distri-
bution, we document the movements of the revenue distribution across the business
cycle. Our sample period is 10 years, which is relatively short for analyzing busi-
ness cycle movements. However, we leverage the fact that we have observations in
many markets and exploit variation in regional unemployment. For this exercise we
expand our sample to include 190 product categories. We expand the sample at this
point for a few reasons. The fact that our unit of observation is now a moment of
the cross-sectional revenue distribution in each time period (rather than product)
greatly decreases the computational burden and allows us to handle more product
categories. Expanding the sample also gives us greater coverage of products and
increased statistical power. However, our results remain unchanged when we use the
30 product categories as before (reported in Table B.7 of Appendix B).
To document the relationship between the regional unemployment rate and vari-
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ous moments of the log revenue distribution, we estimate,
Ycmt = αt + δc + γm + β · URmt + εcmt (2.21)
where Ycmt is a statistic for the distribution of revenue for product category c in
market m in month t. URmt is the unemployment rate for the region m.
25 αt is the
month fixed effect, δc is the product category fixed effect, and γm is the market fixed
effect. The statistics we use for the left-hand-side variable Ycmt include the mean, the
median, the standard deviation, and the difference in log revenue between a product
at the 90th percentile in revenue and 10th percentile in revenue (the spread).
We include month fixed effects for several reasons. First, they remove the secular
and nominal trends from the data, addressing concerns about spurious long-run
trends driving our results. Second, the inclusion of month fixed effects suggests
that the relationship between unemployment and revenue is driven by demand as
discussed by Coibion et al. (2015). Because most goods are produced outside the
local market, aggregate productivity shocks are external to the market, implying that
changes in revenue and unemployment are correlated mostly through local demand
and local supply conditions. The standard errors are clustered by market, product
category, and month, to address concerns about temporal and spatial correlations.
Table 2.6 shows the results. We find that not only do the mean and median of the
distribution of revenue decrease in recessions, as to be expected, but that both the
25The regional unemployment rate URmt is computed as the population weighted unemployment
rate of the counties that constitute market m. The unemployment rates by county are obtained
from the American Community Survey.
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standard deviation and the spread between the 90th and 10th percentile goods falls
as well. The results show that a 1% increase in regional unemployment corresponds
approximately to a 1.2% decrease in mean revenue, a 1.3% decrease in the median
revenue, a 0.40% decrease in the standard deviation and a 1.0% decrease in the
revenue spread.
Not only the level, but also the variance of the revenue distribution is meaningful
for monetary policy because the response of aggregate prices to a monetary shock
increases with the variance of revenue distribution. As the variance increases, the
price of high revenue products that constitute a proportionately larger fraction of
aggregate price become more responsive to monetary shocks. The price of low revenue
products become less responsive, but these only constitute a small and decreasing
proportional of aggregate price.
While we are focused on documenting the behavior of the revenue distribution
and do not investigate further into the reasons behind these patterns, recent studies
of consumer shopping behavior over the business cycle provide potential channels
through which this may occur. For example, Coibion et al. (2015) find that house-
holds reallocate consumption expenditures toward low-price retailers when local eco-
nomic conditions deteriorate. Jaimovich et al. (2017) find that people traded down
in the quality of goods and services they consumed during the Great Recession. Nevo
and Wong (2017) document extensive substitution behavior by consumers over the
business cycle. They find that households increase coupon usage, increase purchases
of goods on sale, buy larger sized products, buy generic products, and substitute pur-
chases toward big box (discount) stores during recessions. Any one or a combination
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of these consumer substitution patterns could potentially generate the movements in
the revenue distribution that we document.
2.4 Aggregate Implications
Our results in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 suggest that revenue is non-neutral and has
important implications for the real effect of monetary policy. In this section, we use
a quantitative dynamic model to demonstrate our theoretical predictions in a fully
general equilibrium setting. Then, we utilize the model to show that the distribution
of revenue has a meaningful effect on monetary policy transmission.
2.4.1 Quantitative Model
We build a quantitative model that matches both the pricing moments found in
the microdata and business cycle variations in the revenue distribution. We augment
a standard menu cost model similar to those found in Golosov and Lucas (2007) and
Midrigan (2011) to match the shifts in the revenue distribution across the business
cycle. We use this model to demonstrate the effect of revenue variation for price
setting behavior and monetary policy transmission. In addition, we quantify the
degree of state-dependence of monetary transmission implied by our mechanism.
Households
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subject to the budget constraint,
PtCt +Bt = Rt−1Bt−1 +WtNt + Πt.
Ct is the household consumption of the composite good, Nt is total labor supply,
Bt is one-period nominal bonds, Pt is the aggregate price level, Rt is the nominal
rate of return, Wt is nominal wage, and Πt is the firm profits that are transferred to
the households. φt is an aggregate preference shock that represents a shock to the
discount rate and affects the intertemporal substitution of households.
Households consume a continuum of a variety of products indexed by i. The











where ιit is the idiosyncratic preference for product i and ε is the elasticity of sub-
stitution across goods. Households choose to consume variety cit to maximize Ct
subject to the constraint,
1∫
0
q−1it pitcit = PtCt
where pit is the price of product i. The household’s subproblem of variety choice
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is standard except for qit. In this model qit serves as an exogenous demand shifter
that is needed to match the documented changes in the revenue distribution across
the business cycle. We treat qit as exogenous in order to focus on the firm’s decision
process and remain amenable to different household processes that may generate the
shifts in demand. One possible interpretation of qit is as the cost of shopping effort
(see Coibion et al., 2015). Another interpretation would treat qit as the household’s
valuation of product quality, defined as a function of the product’s idiosyncratic
components (zit, ιit), where zit is the idiosyncratic productivity of the producer. This
interpretation is in line with the findings of Jaimovich et al. (2017).26
We model qit as depending on the aggregate state of the economy as well as the
idiosyncratic characteristics of the product.
qit = q(q̃(zit, ιit), φt)





With a shopping cost interpretation, this condition means that in recessions the
opportunity cost of time falls, and it becomes less costly to buy products that house-
holds usually purchase infrequently. A product quality interpretation would imply
that household sensitivity to quality differences decreases in recessions.
26To interpret as valuation of product quality it may be more intuitive to specify qit as a part of






ε−1 which gives almost identical results.
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The inclusion of idiosyncratic preferences ιit is necessary because the revenue dis-
tribution is an important determinant of output fluctuations in our setting. Studies
such as Burnstein and Hellwig (2007) and Kumar and Zhang (2016) find that de-
mand shocks constitute a large fraction of the idiosyncratic shocks that firms face,
and ignoring this component may lead to an understatement of revenue dispersion.
In the calibration of this model, we find that this is true in our sample as well.




















Following much of the literature on menu cost models, we assume that the mon-
etary authority conducts monetary policy by targeting a path of nominal GDP
lnMt = lnMt−1 + ν
m
t (2.26)
where Mt = PtYt is nominal GDP. Innovations ν
m
t follow the normal distribution
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N(0, σ2m). The aggregate preference parameter φt follows,
lnφt = ρφlnφt−1 + ν
φ
t . (2.27)




Firms produce a differentiated product yit with linear production technology
yit = zitnit
where zit is firm i’s idiosyncratic productivity and nit is labor demand. The firm’s








where the demand for yit is given by equation (2.24).
Now consider the firm’s dynamic problem. Henceforth, for notational simplicity
we omit the subscript i except when explicitly necessary. It is more convenient to




in equation (2.24) for yt, the firm’s current period profit is






Idiosyncratic productivity follows the process
lnzt = lnzt−1 + ν
z
t
where νzt is a shock to productivity. The shock ν
z
t follows a Poisson process,
νzt ∼
 0 : with probability θzN(0, σ2z) : with probability 1− θz

and idiosyncratic demand evolves according to
lnιt = lnιt−1 + ν
ι
t
where νιt follows the normal distribution N(0, σ
2
ι ). We assume that log productivity
and log demand follow a random walk, which allows us to define the idiosyncratic
state of a firm jointly as ωt = ztιt. This reduces the number of state variables
and decreases the computational burden of solving this model numerically. The
idiosyncratic state ωt then follows





Since this variable follows a random walk, we include a probability of firm exit to
keep the distribution of firms stationary. We assume that firms exit with probability
α. When a firm exits, it is replaced by a new firm with zt = ιt = ωt = 1. We now
write the firm’s dynamic problem, where each period it must pay a small menu cost
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bt to change its price as,
V (µt, ωt;Yt, φt)
= max
{














where Λt+1 is the stochastic discount factor.
As in Section 2.2 we assume that the menu cost bt is equal to b̄ · (rev∗)k. Thus bt
has the form,









where µ∗ is the desired optimal markup of the firm. We also assume that with a
small probability χ the menu cost bt is equal to zero. This introduces some time-
dependence in price setting behavior and is often thought of as a reduced form
mechanism of complicated processes that generate small changes to menu costs such
as, for example, the existence of multi-product firms.
In what follows, we compare the baseline case in which revenue variation matters
for the price setting problem (k < 1) with the revenue neutral case (k = 1). We
demonstrate that the empirical relationship between revenue and price setting doc-
umented in Section 2.3 is inconsistent with the revenue neutral case. Furthermore,
we demonstrate the aggregate implications of accounting for revenue variation in the
price setting problem with regard to the real effect of monetary policy.
We use log linear approximations of the relationship between labor supply and
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output to allow convenient aggregation as in Nakamura and Steinsson (2010). We use
the Krusell and Smith (1998) algorithm to solve the model numerically. We assume
that firms perceive the evolution of the price level Pt+1
Pt










The function Γ(·) is a linear function of the variables, their squares, and the interac-
tion terms between the shocks and the aggregate state variables. The resulting R2 of
the regression of the perceived evolution on the actual evolution is in excess of 99%.
2.4.2 Calibration And Results
Following our empirical results, we set the time unit of the model to a month.
The time discount factor β is set to an annual value of 0.96. Following much of the
menu cost literature, we set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution γ equal to 1
and the inverse Frisch elasticity 1
η
to zero to facilitate computation. We calibrate the
elasticity of demand to ε = 3, which is in line with the median elasticities estimated
in Nevo (2001) and Broda and Weinstein (2006).
The standard deviation for nominal GDP σm is calibrated to be 0.52 percent,
which is the standard deviation of the HP-filtered nominal GDP between 1947 and
2019. The persistance (ρφ) and the variance (σφ) of the preference parameter φt is
calibrated such that the persistence and variance of real GDP in the model is equal
to 0.946 and 0.48 percent, matching that of the HP-filtered real GDP series from
1947 to 2019.
For the baseline case with revenue variation (k < 1), the parameters governing
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the productivity process, the demand process, the rate of product exit, and the
intercept of the menu cost (θz, σz, σι, α, b̄) are jointly calibrated to match the average
frequency of adjustment, the median absolute size of adjustment, the variance of log
revenue, the strength of the relationship between the probability of adjustment and
revenue, and the strength of the relationship between the absolute size of adjustment
and revenue. We target an average frequency of adjustment of 6.7% and a median
absolute size of adjustment of 10.4% to match the moments from our sample.27 We
target the variance of revenue to be 1.30 in steady state which is what we find in our
dataset. We target for the probability of adjustment to increase by 0.14 percentage
points, and the absolute size of adjustment to decrease by 0.11 percentage points, in
response to a 10% increase in revenue. This reflects the results from column (1) of
Table 2.3 and Table 2.5 respectively.
We calibrate the frequency of productivity shocks 1 − θz to be 14.6% and the
standard deviation of the shock σz to be 8.5%. The standard deviation of the demand
shock σι is set to 15.2%, and the rate of product exit is set to 7.5%. The size of the
menu cost b is 0.022 which implies that the total cost of changing prices amounts to
0.3% of the steady state revenue. This is smaller than the value of 0.7% of revenue
found by Levy et al. (1997).
The parameters governing the degree to which menu cost increases with revenue
k and the probability of zero menu cost χ are set to 0.301 and 1.27% respectively.
27We calibrate to the median absolute size of adjustment instead of the mean to alleviate the
effects of outliers, as is common in the literature. In our model, the mean and the median size of
adjustment are close in value whereas in the data there is a larger difference. This suggests that the
tails of the distribution of the size of price changes are thicker than implied by the shock processes
in our model.
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We estimate these parameters from our sample using a parametric model based on
our results in Section 2.2 and comparable to the current model. A full discussion of
how we estimate these parameters can be found in Appendix B
We adopt the following functional form for lnqt in order to match the changes in
the revenue distribution over the business cycle,
lnqt = ψ0 · ((1 + ψ1) ·min(lnωt, 0) + (1− ψ1) ·max(lnωt, 0) + ψ2) · lnφt.
Parameters (ψ0, ψ1, ψ2) are calibrated to match the change in the mean, the median,
and the standard deviation of the log revenue distribution with the state of the
economy as shown in Table 2.6.
For the revenue neutral case (k = 1), we choose to keep the same parameters as the
baseline model with the exception of the menu cost parameter b̄, which we calibrate to
match the frequency of price adjustment in the data. We believe that this approach
allows for the most direct comparison between the model economies, and worry that
recalibrating all the parameters would raise the issue of comparability across models.
Although we have not recalibrated the parameters, the revenue neutral version of the
model also does a relatively good job of matching the data moments.28 The results
are shown in Tables 2.7 and 2.8.
Figure 2.4 compares the steady state relationship between price setting behavior
and revenue of the two model economies. Panels (a) and (b) show the relationship
between price setting and revenue in the baseline economy. Panel (a) depicts the
28We have experimented with recalibrating all parameters to match the target moments and all
our results remain qualitatively the same and quantitatively similar (unreported).
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relationship between the probability of price adjustment and log revenue. We group
each product-month observation by revenue into percentile bins and compute the
average revenue and the probability of adjustment for each bin. Then, we compute
the log deviation of this revenue from the mean revenue and plot, for each percentile
bin, the log deviation from mean revenue and mean probability of adjustment. The
solid line represents the calibration target, with a slope of 0.014 between log revenue
and probability of adjustment. Panel (b) of Figure 2.4 shows the relationship between
the absolute size of price adjustment and revenue. As in Panel (a), we plot the log
deviation from mean revenue and the mean size of adjustment for each percentile
bin. The solid line represents the calibration target, with a slope of -0.011 between
log revenue and size of adjustment.
Panels (a) and (b) show quite clearly that the relationship between revenue and
price setting in the baseline economy closely resembles the relationship in the data.
The relationship is robust throughout the support of revenue and is consistent in
magnitude. The relationship between probability and size of adjustment with prod-
uct revenue shown in Panels (a) and (b), closely resemble the same relationship found
in the data, shown in Figure 2.2.
Panels (c) and (d) show the relationship between price setting and revenue in
the revenue neutral economy. The contrast between the relationship in the revenue
neutral economy to the baseline economy is stark. There is no discernible relationship
between probability and size of adjustment with product revenue.
In order to measure the impact of monetary policy in our model, we estimate
the impulse response of output using data generated via simulation. We generate
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30,000 periods for estimation and estimate impulse responses using local projection
methods. Since we generate the monetary shock, we treat it as an exogenous shock
for the purposes of estimation. The estimation results are then used to project the
impact of a one standard deviation shock to nominal GDP. All confidence intervals
around the impulse responses are based on Newey-West standard errors and have
95% asymptotic significance.29
Figure 2.5 shows the impulse response functions of the revenue weighted average
log price change in response to a monetary shock by quantile of revenue.30 The
gray line shows the baseline economy and the dashed red line represents the revenue
neutral economy. The price response is similar between the two economies for the
lower revenue quantiles but for quantiles 4 and 5 the price response is much greater
for the baseline economy.
In the baseline economy, the model predicts that the response of prices in the first
quantile is 50% of that of the highest quantile products during the initial period, and
62% of the cumulative response over the first quarter. For comparison, our empirical
results in Section 2.3.2.3 show that the price response of the lowest quantile amounts
29We use local projections implemented by the lpirfs package available in R. For the linear local
projections we treat the nominal gdp innovations as exogenous shocks. We fix the lag length of
the endogenous variables at 1. For the non-linear local projections we use a binary variable to
characterize the states, namely a dummy variable for whether the real gdp is in the 25th or below
percentile of the simulations. This is a simpler version of the estimator from Ramey and Zubairy
(2018) as the state is treated as binary not continuous. For all regressions we use Newey-West
standard errors that allow a lag length of up to 10.
30The log price change used in Figure 2.5 is the revenue weighted average of price change of
individual firms, which is directly analogous to our treatment in the empirical and theoretical
analysis. However, they do not correspond exactly to the composite price index defined by equation
(2.25). Therefore, our output response function and price response function do not necessarily add
up to the monetary shock.
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to 19% of the response of the highest quantile over 12 months and 26% over 18
months.
Figure 2.6 depicts the impulse response function of output to a unit monetary
shock. The gray line depicts the response of output to monetary policy for the base-
line economy (k < 1), and the dashed red line represents the response for the revenue
neutral economy (k = 1). The shaded areas represent 95% deviation confidence in-
tervals. The figure shows that the effect of monetary policy is considerably stronger
for the revenue neutral case compared to the baseline calibration. The difference
in the cumulative effect, measured as the percent difference of the area under the
two impulse response functions, implies that real effect is 50.6% percent stronger for
the neutral case. The fact that the price of high revenue products in the baseline
economy is more responsive to monetary shocks drive the difference in the real effect
of monetary policy between the two economies.
In Figure 2.7, we explore the implications of revenue variation for the state-
dependence of monetary policy. Panel (a) depicts the impulse response for the base-
line economy and Panel (b) depicts the impulse response for the revenue neutral
economy. The blue line in Panels (a) and (b) represent the impulse response of out-
put in the low output state, defined as output in the bottom quarter of simulated
periods. The dashed green line represents the output response in the high output
state, which includes all states not defined as a low output state. Panel (c) depicts
the counter-cyclicality of monetary policy transmission. The gray line plots the de-
gree of counter-cyclicality of output response in the baseline economy, by computing
the difference in the output response in a high versus low output state as a fraction
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of the impulse response in a high output state. The dashed red line does the same
for the revenue neutral economy.
The degree of counter-cyclicality in the real effect of monetary policy is larger for
the baseline economy. In the baseline case, the cumulative output response is 14.9%
larger in the low output state compared to the high output state. In the revenue
neutral economy the cumulative effect is more similar, with the output response
6.3% larger in the low output state. The degree of counter-cyclicality induced by
movements in the revenue distribution across the business cycle thus amounts to
8.6%.
Figures 2.5 through 2.7 illustrate the importance of accounting for revenue vari-
ation in price setting models. Under revenue non-neutrality, the responsiveness of
prices to a monetary shock differs by as much as twice due to differences in revenue.
This results in large heterogeneity in the effect of monetary policy across firms by
revenue. Furthermore, the variance in the responsiveness causes the output response
to monetary policy to be 50.6% smaller in the baseline economy compared to the
revenue neutral economy. Finally, revenue variation also implies that monetary pol-
icy transmission is stronger during recessions compared to expansions. However, this
effect is small due to the fact that the differences in revenue across the business cycle
are much smaller than the variation of revenue across products.
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2.4.3 Extension – Volatility Shocks
In this section we consider an extension of our model to include counter-cyclical
volatility shocks.31 We match the negative correlation between average frequency of
adjustment and aggregate output that we observe in the data using volatility shocks
similar to those in Vavra (2014).
We model the variance of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks zt to increase as
the economy worsens. Specifically, the standard deviation of firm-level idiosyncratic
productivity shocks dt follows,
logdt = ρdlogdt−1 + ν
d
t (2.29)
where νdt ∼ N(0, σ2d). Then, the idiosyncratic productivity follows the process,
lnzt = lnzt−1 + dt−1ν
z
t
and νzt follows the Poisson process,
νzt ∼
 0 : with probability θzN(0, σ2z) : with probability 1− θz

as before.
31Vavra (2014) argues that counter-cyclical volatility shocks are needed to match the counter-
cyclicality in the average frequency of price adjustment found in the his data. Bachman et al.
(2019) find that heightened idiosyncratic volatility increases the probability of price change using
German firm data.
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Similar to Vavra (2014), we make the assumption that dt is perfectly negatively
correlated with the aggregate demand process φt to facilitate computation. In other
words we impose that ρφ = ρd and u
φ
t = −udt , where v
φ
t = σφut, v
d
t = −σdut, and
ut ∼ N(0, 1). This allows us to reduce the state space in the computation of the
model.
We calibrate the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic volatility shock to match
the relationship between aggregate output and average frequency of adjustment over
the business cycle in our sample.32 The other parameters remain unchanged. Table
2.9 shows the business cycle moments of the extended model.
Figure 2.8 compares the impulse response function of output to a monetary policy
shock between economies with different volatility shocks. The gray line shows the
impulse response of our original model without the volatility shocks. The dashed red
line shows the impulse response when the frequency-output coefficient equals -0.035,
and the dashed blue line shows the impulse response when the coefficient is equal
to -0.072. The response of output increases slightly with the inclusion of volatility
shocks, but the difference is minimal.
Figure 2.9 shows the degree of counter-cyclicality – the difference in the output
response between low and high output states – for different volatility shocks. The
degree of counter-cyclicality in the output response decreases as the volatility shocks
get larger, as originally argued by Vavra(2014). Figure 2.9 shows that with volatility
32We present our results regarding the correlation between the average frequency of price change
and the business cycle in Appendix B. Our results also show a negative correlation between average
frequency of price change and output. The magnitude of the relationship that we find in our data
is similar in magnitude of that found in Vavra (2014).
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shocks that match the data on the relationship between output and the average
frequency of adjustment, the effect of the volatility shocks approximately cancel out
the impact of revenue variation on monetary transmission over the business cycle.
We note that the degree of pro-cyclicality implied by the volatility shocks in our
model is much smaller than what is suggested by Vavra (2014). We believe that the
main difference is in the magnitude of the extensive margin. In Vavra’s model, the
extensive margin effect is very large, approximately twice as large as the intensive
margin effect on average. Furthermore the difference in the extensive margin effect
over the business cycle is almost as large as the intensive margin effect itself. We
find that in our model the extensive margin effect is small and does not move much
over the business cycle.
For example, even in the economy with the largest volatility shocks (-0.072), the
revenue weighted frequency of change immediately following a monetary shock(i.e.
the intensive margin effect) is equal to 13.1% in the low output state and 12.8% in
the high state. The extensive margin effect, computed as the difference between the
initial impulse response of the revenue weighted average log price change and the
intensive margin effect, is equal to 15.6% in the low output state and 16.4% in the
high output state. The size of the extensive margin effect and its differences across
states is relatively small.
It is important to take into consideration that our calibration differs considerably
from that of Vavra, who calibrates to moments constructed from a broader CPI
database. In addition, our calibration explicitly targets revenue moments which the
CPI database does not contain. These factors may contribute to the difference in
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the magnitude of the extensive margin effect. Nevertheless, our results to do suggest
that the relative size of the extensive margin effect and its change over the business
cycle should be examined more closely.
2.5 Conclusion
Accounting for variation in product revenue is crucial to understanding price
setting behavior and monetary policy transmission. We find that in the data, the
probability of price adjustment increases in product revenue, while the average size
of price adjustment decreases in revenue. The responsiveness of prices to monetary
policy shocks increases with revenue. These facts all indicate the non-neutrality of
revenue.
The non-neutrality of revenue matters for the real effect of monetary policy. Us-
ing a calibrated menu cost model, we find that the implied non-neutrality based on
pricing moments implies that price response can differ by as much as double across
products with different levels of revenue. As a result, the cumulative output response
to a monetary policy shock in a non-neutral economy is about half that of a revenue
neutral economy. Revenue variation also introduces a counter-cyclical force in mone-
tary policy transmission, which cancels out the pro-cyclical effects of counter-cyclical
volatility shocks.
We uncover substantial heterogeneity in the effect of monetary policy across prod-
ucts with different revenues. This heterogeneity offers insight into the nature of
menu costs and the monetary policy transmission mechanism. We believe under-
standing such heterogeneities can be beneficial in understanding the distributional
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consequences of monetary policy as well as for optimal policy design. In addition, we
contend heterogeneity in the responsiveness of prices across products has important
consequences for our understanding of monetary policy’s aggregate real effects.
Our findings suggest that product revenue should be explicitly considered when
studying price setting behavior and monetary policy. This may be most relevant
in cases where the variance of revenue across similar products is substantial. In
this paper, we document cross-sectional, aggregate, and business cycle implications.
However, revenue variation may also be a key consideration in other settings, such
the effect of monetary policy across different localities where the differences in the
revenue distribution may be large.
Finally, we show that the specific form of adjustment costs can have important
consequences for both microeconomic and macroeconomic behavior. Our findings
may be relevant to other settings such as investment dynamics and employment
decisions where fixed adjustment costs play an important role. A careful exploration
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Figure 2.1: Histogram of synchronization of price adjustment
Note: We show the percentage of revenue from stores that adjusted price for each month
and level of aggregation. Panel (a) shows the results for aggregation to the UPC-retailer-
market, Panel (b) shows the results for aggregation to the UPC-retailer (national), and
Panel (c) shows the results for aggregation to the UPC.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Statistic Revenue
Adjustment frequency 6.7% 1st percentile $2.12
Average adjustment size 14.8% 10th percentile $11.12




Table 2.2: Products and stores per retailer-market
Number of Products Number of Stores
10th Percentile 52 2
50th Percentile 308 18
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Figure 2.2: Product revenue and price setting
Note: We compute the revenue-weighted average probability and absolute size of price
adjustment in each UPC-retailer-market-month. We take a simple average of this variable,
grouped into percentile bins by order of revenue. We plot each percentile bin showing
average log revenue on the X-axis and the average probability of adjustment or the average
absolute size on the Y-axis. For a full discussion of the construction of the variables see
Section 2.3.2.
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Table 2.3: Probability of price adjustment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log revenue 0.0139 0.0115 0.0108 0.0132
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0012)
Observations 18,252,975 18,252,975 18,252,975 14,644,079
R-squared 0.041 0.085 0.133 0.133
Month FE Y Y Y Y
Market FE N Y - -
Retailer FE N Y - -
UPC FE N Y - -
UPC-retailer-market FE N N Y Y
Instrumental variable N N N Y
1st Stage F-stat - - - 186.00
Note: The dependent variable is the revenue-weighted fraction of price changes observed
for a UPC-retailer-market each month. The independent variable of interest is the log of
the total lagged revenue of a UPC-retailer-market each month. The instrumental variable
is the log of the total lagged revenue of a UPC-market summed across retailers excluding
the upc-retailer-market of the observation each month. Standard errors clustered on UPC,
retailer, market, and month separately.
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Table 2.4: Probability of price adjustment: linear probability model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log revenue 0.0236 0.0207 0.0190 0.0234
(0.00193) (0.00145) (0.00206) (0.00213)
Observations 18,252,975 18,252,975 18,252,975 14,644,079
R-squared 0.042 0.083 0.131 0.132
Month FE Y Y Y Y
Market FE N Y - -
Retailer FE N Y - -
UPC FE N Y - -
UPC-retailer-market FE N N Y Y
Instrumental variable N N N Y
1st Stage F-stat - - - 186.00
Note: The dependent variable is a binary variable with a value of one if the revenue from
stores with price changes is larger than 17.6% of total revenue for a UPC-retailer-market in
a given month. The independent variable of interest is the log of the total lagged revenue of
a UPC-retailer-market each month. The instrumental variable is the log of the total lagged
revenue of a UPC-market summed across retailers excluding the upc-retailer-market of the
observation each month. Standard errors clustered on UPC, retailer, market, and month
separately.
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Table 2.5: Size of price adjustment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log revenue -0.0106 -0.0056 -0.0044 -0.0141
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0035)
Observations 2,484,753 2,484,753 2,484,753 2,394,461
R-squared 0.018 0.276 0.458 0.458
Month FE Y Y Y Y
Market FE N Y - -
Retailer FE N Y - -
UPC FE N Y - -
UPC-retailer-market FE N N Y Y
Instrumental variable N N N Y
1st Stage F-stat - - - 11.50
Note: The dependent variable is the revenue-weighted average of the absolute size of price
adjustment conditional on adjustment for a UPC-retailer-market in a given month. The
independent variable of interest is the log of the total lagged revenue of a UPC-retailer-
market each month. The instrumental variable is the log of the total lagged revenue of a
UPC-market summed across retailers excluding the upc-retailer-market of the observation
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Figure 2.3: Cumulative price response to a monetary shock by revenue quantile
Note: This figure shows the cumulative impulse response of prices by revenue quantile, to
an unexpected increase in the federal funds rate during a 30 minute window around FOMC
announcements. Quantile 1 represents products with the lowest revenue and Quantile 5
represents those with the highest revenue. The dashed red lines represent one standard
deviations confidence intervals. The dashed blue lines represent 90% confidence intervals.
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Table 2.6: Revenue distribution over the business cycle
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Median Std deviation Spread
unemployment -1.182 -1.333 -0.401 -1.033
rate (0.348) (0.382) (0.112) (0.308)
Observations 684,868 684,868 684,868 684,868
R-squared 0.814 0.787 0.542 0.561
Note: The dependent variables are the moments of the log product revenue distribution
across retailers for a given UPC-market-month. The independent variable of interest is the
unemployment rate for a given market, computed from county level unemployment. All
regressions include fixed effects for market, month, and product category. Standard errors
clustered on market, month, and product category separately.
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Table 2.7: Target moments
Steady state moments Target Baseline Neutral
(k=0.3) (k=1)
Frequency of price adjustment 0.067 0.067 0.067
Median size of price adjustment 0.104 0.102 0.112
Variance of log revenue 1.30 1.32 1.31
∂prob
∂lnrev 0.014 0.014 0.000
∂size
∂lnrev -0.011 -0.011 -0.000
Business cycle moments
∂rev
∂N 1.18 1.18 1.18
∂rev50
∂N 1.33 1.42 1.29
∂std(rev)
∂N 0.40 0.50 0.47
Persistence of real GDP 0.946 0.942 0.935
Standard deviation of real GDP 0.48% 0.50% 0.53%
Non-target moments
Average size of price adjustment 0.148 0.105 0.111
∂(rev90−rev10)
∂N 1.03 1.42 1.22
Average frequency - output relation -0.068 0.069 -0.054
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Table 2.8: Parameter values
Parameter Baseline Neutral Description
β 0.961/12 - discount factor
ε 3 - elasticity of demand
α 0.075 - rate of product exit
b̄ 0.022 0.05 menu cost intercept
k 0.301 1 menu cost slope
χ 0.0127 - probability of zero menu cost
1− θz 0.146 - probability of productivity shock
σz 0.085 - standard deviation of productivity shock
σι 0.152 - standard deviation of demand shock
σm 0.52% - standard deviation of nominal GDP
ρφ 0.965 - persistence of preference parameter
σφ 0.112% - standard deviation preference shock
ψ0 1.2 - slope parameter in exogenous demand
ψ1 0.75 - kink parameter in exogenous demand
ψ2 2.15 - intercept parameter in exogenous demand
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Figure 2.4: Revenue and price setting: comparing model and data
Note: In each panel, we group each product-month observation into percentile bins by
revenue and compute the average revenue and the probability or absolute size of adjustment
in each bin. We compute the log deviation of this revenue from the mean value, which
we plot. The solid lines represent the calibration target, with a slope of 0.014 between log
revenue and probability of adjustment and -0.011 between log revenue and absolute size of
adjustment. Panels (a) and (b) represent the results from the baseline economy (k < 1),
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k=0.3 k=1.0
Figure 2.5: Impulse response of revenue-weighted average price change to a unit
monetary shock by revenue quantile
Note: Each impulse response represents the response of each revenue quantile, with 1 being
the lowest revenue products and 5 the highest revenue products. The gray line shows the
impulse response function for the baseline economy. The red dashed line shows the impulse
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k=0.3 k=1.0
Figure 2.6: Impulse response of output to a unit monetary shock
Note: The gray line shows the impulse response function for the baseline economy. The
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k=0.3 k=1.0
(c) Counter-cyclicality
Figure 2.7: State-dependence of output response to a unit monetary shock
Note: Panel (a) shows the impulse response for the baseline economy (k < 1). Panel
(b) shows the impulse response for the revenue neutral economy (k = 1). The blue line in
Panels (a) and (b) represent the impulse response of output in the low output state, defined
as output in the bottom quarter of simulated periods. The dashed green line represents
the output response in the high output state, which includes all states not defined as a low
output state. Panel (c) shows the counter-cyclicality of the output response by computing
the difference in the output response in a high versus low output state as a fraction of
the impulse response in a high output state. The gray line plots the degree of counter-
cyclicality for the baseline economy. The dashed red line does the same for the revenue
neutral economy.
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Table 2.9: Target moments : Extended model
Business cycle moments Target Baseline Ext.1 Ext.2
∂rev
∂N 1.18 1.18 1.33 1.37
∂rev50
∂N 1.33 1.42 1.56 1.60
∂std(rev)
∂N 0.40 0.50 0.44 0.42
Persistence of real GDP 0.946 0.942 0.934 0.931
Standard deviation of real GDP 0.48% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50%
Average frequency - output relation -0.068 0.069 -0.039 -0.072
Volatility parameter
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Figure 2.8: Impulse response of output to a unit monetary shock
Note: The gray line shows the impulse response function for the model economy without
volatility shocks. The red dashed line shows the impulse response function for the economy
where the frequency-output relation has a coefficient of -0.035. The blue dashed line shows
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Main 0.069 Ext. −0.035   Ext. −0.072
Figure 2.9: Counter-cyclicality of impulse response of output to a unit monetary
shock
Note: We show the counter-cyclicality of the output response by computing the difference
in the output response in a high versus low output state as a fraction of the impulse
response in a high output state. The gray line plots the degree of counter-cyclicality for the
baseline economy. The dashed red line does the same for the revenue neutral economy. The
gray line plots the degree of counter-cyclicality for the model economy without volatility
shocks. The red dashed line plots the degree of counter-cyclicality for the economy where
the frequency-output relation has a coefficient of -0.035. The blue dashed line shows the




What Inventory Behavior Tells Us About
Markups
3.1 Introduction
The increase in market concentration in several industries through the second
half of the tweentieth1 century has brought the literature to pay close attention to
many of the changes that may accompany this. For example, Gutierrez and Philip-
pon (2018) point to this as a possible culprit for underinvestmented. Autor et al.
(2019) study the fall in the labor share resulting from increasing concentration due
to heterogeneous productivity. The question of the degree of market power that
firms hold because of this concentration is still open and the price markup, defined
as the ratio between sale price and marginal cost, provides away to start answering it.
Given the difficulty to acquire good quality price and marginal cost information,
1See for example Gutierrez and Philippon (2018).
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economist have resorted to estimate the price markup through several methods,
making use of equilibrium and firm’s optimization conditions. One of the favored
methodologies when estimated the markup for several industries is based on Hall
(1988) and makes use of the first order condition of the firms variable cost minimiza-
tion problem. Notably, recent work by De Loecker et al. (2020) used this result,
along with balance sheet firm data, to estimate the change in the economy-wide
markup since the 1960’s. In their results, they find that the price markup may have
rise by as much as 60%. This finding, has sparked big interest in the topic because
of the implications that a change of this magnitude would have.
Basu (2019) pointed out a concern with this estimation. A change in the price-
markup of the magnitude found by De Loecker et al. (2020) should be accompanied
by significant changes in the economy which are not aparent. Albeit, no estimation
method is perfect and using the cost minimization first order conditions may have
shortcomings. Mainly, the costs used in estimation should correspond to variable
inputs of production. Two problems arrise with this assumption, first, the way firms
keep their accounting records of cost may vary significantly. Having firms report
some overhead fixed costs as cost of production when others may not. Second, some
inputs used in production may not correspond to the cost of goods sold if the firms
holds down inventories.
In this paper we look to contribute to the debate by looking at the change in price
markup through a different first order condition. Based on Bils and Kahn (2000)
we consider the problem of a firm that must hold inventories to produce sales. The
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first order condition of the firm ties down the price-markup to the ratio of the stock
available to sales, an important statistic in the literature of inventories. Intuitively,
the cost to the firm of missing a sale is given by the markup. In times when the
markup is higher, the firm will want to hold larger quantities of inventories. This
way, the stock to sales ratio, which is readily available from balance sheet data, pro-
vides information on the changes of the price markup.
In addition to the stock to sales ratio, our first order condition includes the ex-
pected growth rate of marginal cost. We use balance sheet data to estimate the firms
production function to back out total factor productivity. This variable reflects both
technology and input price changes and can be used to forecast the firm’s marginal
cost growth. Our first order condition, allows us to remain agnostic to changes in
prices or market structure and the actual breakdown of the cost of production.
In our estimation, we find that the stock to sales ratio, accounting for changes
in the productivity of the stock is decreasing through the entire period, as previ-
ously documented in the literature2 However, the firms discounted marginal cost
growth increases through time, due to a decreasing discount rate and a relatively
flat marginal cost series. The combination of these factors point towards a slightly
decreasing markup, with a fall of around 5% between 1970 and 2018. Most of the
fall happens throughout the 70’s and 80’s decades and the series becomes relatively
flat starting in the 2000’s.
2see McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000).
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Two factors lead to the conclusion of falling markups. First, the falling stock to
sales ratio reflects a smaller loss of the firm when a sale is not produced. This remains
true even when adjusting for the increase in the productivity of the stock to produce
sales. Second, the falling discount rate implies a falling cost of carrying inventories
which should make the firm more willing to hold stock in order to produce sales.
Our conclusion from this results is that further study of the importance of firm dy-
namics are necessary in order to understand the changes in the price-markup. Static
first order conditions, while convenient, appear to be missing important information
given the changes in the dynamic varibles of the firms problem, the stock available
and the discount rate.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we present a theoretical
framework in which firms hold a stock of the final good in order to produce sales and
smooth the cost of production. Section 3 presents the methodology and results of
the estimation of the adjusted stock to sales ratio and discounted expected growth
in marginal cost. In section 4 we use the estimated series to back the changes in the
price markup. Section 5 presents conclusions.
3.2 Theoretical framework
In this section we develop a model similar to Bils and Kahn (2000) in which
firms hold inventories to facilitate sales. This is the current consensus reached in
the literature, as it explains procyclical inventory investment. Inventories, or more
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specifically, the available stock, can facilitate sales by, for example, preventing stock-
outs or allowing to match products with costumers. 3. In our model sales of the
final good consist of succesful matches between consumers and the available stock,
at. The firm chooses both the available stock and price pt before matching hap-
pens and after observing the aggregate state of the economy Θt. Given the stock,
price and the aggregate state, consumers search for the product with an intensity
0 ≤ d(pt,Θt) ≥ 1. Sales are determined by a matching function given by
st(pt, at; Θt) = d(pt; Θt)a
φt
t (3.1)
By construction st ≤ at. The time-varying parameter 0 < φt ≤ 1 is the elasticity
of sales with respect to stock and represents how essential the stock available is
to succesfuly match with consumers. To understand the nature of this parameter
consider the perfect competition example where
d(pt; Θt) =
 1 if pt = p
∗
t
0 if pt 6= p∗t
(3.2)
In this case, consumers will buy the product at the market price as long as they
are succesfully matched with it. Matching will only depend on the stock available.
Consider two types of firms, the first firm has a fixed share of the stock across its
stores. The second firm has a distribution network between its stores, allowing to
3For a broader discussion of inventory investment behavior see for example Wen (2003).
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move stock where necessary. Even if both firms produce the same stock a∗, the sec-
ond firm will reach more consumers facilitating matches and sales, this is captured
by a higher level of φt. The time variation in φt is due to changes in distribution and
inventory management technology through time.
Let yt be the level of production of the final good at a cost given by the function
C(yt;ωt) where ωt represents the realization of the firms idiosyncratic productivity.
The stock available evolves according to
at = at−1 − st−1 + yt (3.3)
With the matching function 3.1 and assuming both aggregate state and produc-
tivity processes are first order Markov, the solution to the the profit maximization
problem of the firm satisfies the following Bellman Equation subject to 3.1 and 3.3
V (a; Θ, ω) = max {ps− C(y;ω) + E [βV (a′; Θ′, ω′)]} (3.4)
Here β represents the realization of the stochastic discount factor. Let ct be the



























Where ξ is the price elasticity of the search intensity function d(pt; Θt). Notice
that the search intensity function d(pt; Θt) appears in equation 3.5 only through the
ratio of sales to the stock available st
at
, which is observable in the data. Focusing on
equation 3.5 allows us to remain agnostic to the shape of d(pt; Θt), meaning equation
3.5 remains valid under any type of market structure that can be modelled in this
way. This includes the cases of perfect competition and monopoly.
The derivative of sales with respect to the stock available is φt
st
at
so we can re-
arrange equation 3.5 as follows to get an interpretation. At the optimal choice of
at a perturbation ∆at must be such that the change in costs equals the change in
revenue,composed by the fraction of ∆at sold at a price of pt and the fraction kept










Using equation 3.5 we can study changes in the price markup through the changes





































. The markup is the forgone benefit when a match fails hence, in times
when the markup is high, the firm wants a higher stock relative to sales in order to
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succesfully match. Additionaly, changes in technology represented by φt affect the
relation between the stock to sales ratio and the markup. At a given markup, if φt
becomes higher, meaning the firm is better at converting stock into sales, the firm
will hold a lower stock.
As we can see, the changes in markup in the last four decades can be infered by
the changes of these three variables, the stock-to-sales ratio, the expected change
in marginal cost, and the elasticity φt. In the following section we will look at the
historical behavior of this variables and work our way to the implication for the price
markup.
3.3 Historical look of the firms’ production
In this section we use annual firm level data from Compustat for the period
between 1970 and 2017, to recover or estimate the variables connected to the price
markup. We assume the firm has a production technology that takes variable inputs,







The production function parameters vary by industry as classified by two digits
NAICS codes. There is no constraint on returns to scale through the parameters, we
allow them to take any positive value.
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3.3.1 Firm’s forecast of marginal cost growth
The last term in equation 3.7 is the expected growth of discounted marginal cost
for the firm. We take the stance of modeling this as a forecast made by the firm
with the information available until the moment of the forecast. Two components
enter these value, the stochastic discount factor and the growth rate of marginal cost.
For a given stock-to-sales ratio, the price markup is decreasing in both of them. If
marginal cost is higher in the future, the firm will choose to keep a higher stock for
cost-smoothing purposes, even if the markup is high.
We assume that for the forecast, the firm treats the stochastic discount factor and
















A firm forecasts the stochastic discount factor through its current financing cost,
rft . Simply put, we assume the firm chooses to discount future values using its time
cost of funds. We compute real financing costs, as the ratio between “Interest and
related expenses” and the firms total debt minus inflation4. Figure 3.1 shows in
panel (a) the average βt = (1+r
f
t )
−1, weighted by sales, from 1970 to 2018. Notably,
financing costs have steadily declined through these five decades to the point where
the financing rate is below inflation. On average, for the last few years in our sample,
the average financing rate is about half a percentage point lower than inflation. As
4Inflation is obtained through the GDP deflator
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a result, the discount factor used by the firm has increased mostly increased during
this period, with a few sharp declines corresponding to major recessions, as indicated
by shading.5. Starting in 2004, the discount rate has been often above one, reflecting
a financing rate below inflation.
On panel (b) of Figure 3.1 we show estimated densities for the distribution of
discount factor (x-axis) across firms. In 1975, the density is almost centered a little
above 0.9 while for 2005 and 2015 most of the mass has shifted towards higher values.
The quick take of this graph is that the financing rates of all firms in the sample have
decreased in this period as opposed to just the average rate. Further, the dispersion
in rates has decreased as well, meaning most firms access similar lower rates.
The second component of the firm’s forecast is the expected growth rate of
marginal cost. Given the production function 3.8, marginal cost for firm i in in-











As mentioned above, L represents variable inputs rather than just labor. We
assume that for the firm forecast, only productivity is expected to change from the








= PKit . Implicitely, we are also
assuming that the firm considers its forecasts for productivity and input prices to be
independent, so we treat them as multiplicatively separable through the expectation
5A year is shaded if the economy was in recession for at least one quarter according to NBER
recession dates.
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We follow the procedure in ? to estimate the parameters of the production func-
tion by industry. We recover the values of productivity as
ω̂it = (yit − ε̂it)− β̂j
K
Kit − β̂Lj PLitLit (3.11)
Let FGIit be the final good inventories at the end of year t. The stock available
is ait = sit + FGIit. Com bining this with equation 3.3 we can compute production
yit = sit+FGIit−FGIit−1. The correction term ε̂ corresponds to the etimated error
from the first stage of the ACF procedure. We use “cost of goods sold” for the value
of PLitLit. Panel (a) of Figure 3.2 shows the sales-weighted average and median of
our estimated productivity series. The productivity series increases steadily through
the period of our sample. However, for both average and median, the total increase
in the period is very modest, at around one percentage point. This points towards a
flat series of expected growth in marginal cost. There is no evident cyclical behavior
in the productivity series.
Having the productivity series ω̂, we build a forecast of marginal cost with a
second order polinomial regression with firm and year fixed effects. The estimated
equation is given by
cit+1 = γi + γt + ρ1ct + ρ2c
2
t + uit+1 (3.12)
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We follow Blundell and Bond (1998) , instrumenting with lag-differences of the
dependent variable. Panel (b) of Figure 3.2 shows the sales-weighted average and
median of the estimated growth in marginal cost. As foreshadowed by our produc-
tivity series, the estimate for expected marginal cost growth is very flat through the
entire period. Figure 3.3 shows the estimated series of discounted expected marginal
cost growth. The contribution of the discount factor β dominates, making the series
steadily increasing through the period. This result provides the first component of
our markup estimation. From equation 3.7 we have that, holding everything else
constant, the markup is strictly decreasing in the discounted expected marginal cost
growth. Our result in this section puts pressure towards a decreasing markup in our
sample period.
3.3.2 Stock-to-sales ratio
The next component in our markup estimation is the ratio between the available
stock and the sales of the production good. This variable holds the key intuition
of this paper. If markups are increasing, the loss faced by the firm from a stockout
is also increasing. Everything else constant, a firm will increase the available stock
relative to sales to prevent stockouts as they become costlier. Figure 3.4 shows the
sales-weighted average of the ratio for all industries on panel (a). Consistent with
the literature, the ratio falls from the seventies and through the great moderation,
reaching a through in the mid-2000’s. There is a modest recovery of the ratio in the
last decade of the sample, the period after the great recession. In panel (b), we show
that this behavior is not present in all industies. In the case of retail and wholesale
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trade, there is no obvious decline in the ratio. These are industries with higher
dependence on inventories, as evidenced by the larger average value and volatility of
the ratio when compared to the rest of the economy.
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Equation 3.7 shows a positive relation between the markup and the ratio of avail-






< 1. Figure 3.3 shows that this is the case
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on average in our data up until 2003. From 2004 onwards, our data suggests a neg-
ative relation between the markup and stock to sales ratio. This point to a markup
that should be decreasing through the entire sample period, if every other component
in equation 3.7 is held constant. However, in the case of retail and wholesale trade,
the industries for which are model should fit best, we dont see this obvious decline
of the ratio. Additionaly, it is still necesary to look at was has happened to φ, the
technology that allows firms to turn available stock into sales.
3.3.3 The elasticity of sales with respect to available stock
In this part we estimate the elasticity of sales with respect to available, φ. We esti-
mate the following specification as in Blundell and Bond (1998), instrumenting with
lagged differences of the variables to correct for bias in the autorregresive coefficient.
ln(ait) = γi + γt + ρln(ait−1) +
1
φ
ln(sit) + uit (3.13)
Table 3.1 shows the estimated values for the entire period in the first column.
Our estimate of phi for the entire sample is around 0.85. Lower values of phi mean
that the firm requires a higher stock available to produce sales. Given this value of φ
even under a setup in which consumers are always willing to buy the good at market
price d(p∗t ) = 1, as in the example in Section 2, a firm with a stock of a will be left
with a0.85(a0.15−1). As φ approaches 1, the firm does not require inventories to make
a sale, however, a monopolist firm can still choose to carry inventories by choosing
pt so that d(pt) < 1. From equation 3.7 we can see that increasing φ increases the
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importance of the marginal cost ratio for the markup. This is because as the firm
stops requiring inventories to produce sales, it can use inventories to smooth costs of
production through time.
Table 3.1: Dynamic panel estimates of the elasticity of sales to stock available
Full sample pre 2000 post 2000






Obs. 87,523 45,755 41,768
The second and third columns show estimates of φ, dividing the sample before
and after the year 2000. For the first period, from 1970 to 1999, the estimate of
φ is around 0.68. For the second part it increase to about 0.89. This is consistent
with the changes in distribution and sales technology of the past decades. The need
of the firm to hold inventories to produce sales has decreased considerably. Firms
need lower ratios of stock available to sales, everything else equal. For example, a
firm that wanted to sell 2 units before 2000 would need an available stock of 2.77
units, delivering a ratio of available to sale of 1.39. After the year 2000, the stock
available required to sell 2 units is 2.17 and the ratio 1.09. This increase in φ allows to
accomodate the decrease in the stock to sales ratio even if markups were increasing.
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3.4 The price markup
Following equation 3.7 we estimate the change in the markup through our sample
with the variable estimates from the previous section. We split the value of φ as
estimated, inputing one value for firms before the year 2000 and another one after-
wards. Figure 3.5 shows the estimated markup considering both a change in φ (panel
(a)) and holding it constant (panel (b)). In both cases we see a mild decrease in the
markup over the period. Considering a change in φ the markup decreases about 5%
and becomes relatively constant starting in the 2000’s. With a constant φ the drop
is weaker of about 2.5% points. These are the results of a decreasing stock to sales
ratio combined with a ratio of marginal cost thats both increasing and less than
unity for most of the years in our sample. After, the ratio of marginal cost becomes
higher in the 2000’s we see a markup that starts slightly recovering.
Our result that markups have fallen over the last 40 years is in contrast to much of
the literature, we are working on allowing for more flexible changes in the matching
technology. Additionally, we are working on investigating the industries that most
closely match our intuitive understanding of inventories. The model should have
more validity for industries that hold physical inventories.
The fact that the discount rate of the firm decreases steadily produces an increas-
ing discounted marginal cost growth. It is cheaper for firms to hold inventories as
the rate goes down, making it relatively cheaper to produce presently. The decreas-
ing cost of holding inventories together with the decrease in the stock to sales ratio
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Figure 3.5: Changes in price markup, index































implies that the relative cost to the firm of loosing a sale is decreasing, leading to
the conclusion of a falling markup.
3.5 Conclusion
The theoretical framework of our paper shows that some of the firm’s dynamic
variables play an important role when determining the price-markup. If the firm is
able to hold inventories, the change in the discounted marginal cost of production
in the future becomes relevant fot the firms decision to sell at a certain price. If
the discounted marginal cost of production is increasing, the firm can hold on to
sell presently and accumulate stock of the final good. However, firms in the sample
are constantly reducing the relative stock of final goods. This fact, follows partially
from lower need to hold stock in order to produce sales, as distribution and inventory
technology has become better. This last fact is not enough to rationalize the fall in
the relative stock, menaing that additionaly, the cost to the firm of loosing a sale
must be decreasing, at least slightly. This cost is refelcted by the price-markup, as a
firm looses this value when failing to complete a sale. The historical behavior of both
stock and discounted marginal cost are hard to reconcile with a scenario in which
markups are increasing. If markups are indeed growing, further work on the firm’s




Appendix For Chapter I
Markets
We choose 32 markets on which we conduct our analysis. The designated market
areas are defined by The Nielsen Company and correspond approximately (although
not exactly) to a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). The full list is provided in
Table B.3.
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San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose CA
Seattle-Tacoma WA
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Appendix For Chapter II
Exogenous Adjustment Hazards
Let Λ(x) be a function representing the exogenous adjustment hazard of a firm
with price gap x, perhaps due to an exogenous shock to menu cost. Let F̃ (x), f̃(x)
be the distribution of price gaps before adjustment via Λ(x) and F (x), f(x) be the
distribution of price gaps post adjustment via adjustment hazard. This implies that
f(x) = (1 − Λ(x))f̃(x) with mass equal to
∫
Λ(x)f̃(x)dx at x = 0. Assuming that
Λ(x) is independent of revenue, the following equations hold.



































Equations (B.3) and (B.4) are identical to equations (2.6) and (2.7).
Suppose the monetary shock ∆m occurs after distribution f̃(x) has been realized.
(This is equivalent to an assumption about the independence of the monetary shock













The expected price response to an arbitrarily small monetary policy shock is,
A(rev∗) = F (−ζ(rev∗)) + (1− F (ζ(rev∗))) +
∫
Λ(x)f̃(x)dx











Note that as before A(rev∗) = prob(rev∗).
Then the relationship between product revenue and the intensive margin, exten-






























Note that equations (B.6), (B.7), and (B.8) are identical to the case without the
adjustment hazard.
Estimating Menu Cost Parameters
In this appendix we describe how we estimate the parameters of the menu cost
function that we use in Table 2.8 of Section 2.4. We use the simple model described
in Section 2.2 and Appendix B to generate simulated price changes and compare
features of the data to the simulation results. This allows us to estimate the rela-
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tionship between menu costs and revenue. We find that menu costs scale less than
one-to-one with revenue.
Firms change prices for two reasons. First, with probability χ, random shocks
arrive that temporarily make price adjustment costless. This is standard in the lit-
erature to fit small price changes. Absent these shocks, firms compare the menu cost
with the loss from a sub-optimal price. We assume the menu cost has the functional
form, b̄(rev∗)k. The main purpose of this section is to estimate the parameters k and
χ.
We target two features of the data. First, from our data, we take observed revenue
for each product and remove time, product, and retailer-market fixed effects. We
then sort the products by this residual revenue ˆrevijt into deciles d = 1, 2...10. For
each decile, we calculate the average frequency of price change ¯freqd. In addition,
within each decile, we estimate a density of observed price changes fpcd (.) via a kernel
density estimation. We estimate the density at 201 grid points (index by m) using a
Gaussian kernel and the fixed bandwidth of .025. These features are the targets of
the estimation.
The model we use to generate pricing simulations is a parametric version of the
model in Section 2.2 and Appendix B. Given a revenue distribution and a distribution
of price gaps, we compare the menu cost to the loss from suboptimal price using
equation (2.2) and generate the frequency of adjustment and the distribution of
price changes. We assume that revenue follows a log-normal distribution in every
decile and that the price gaps follow a two parameter Gamma distribution. We do
this to allow a relatively flexible distribution of observed price changes, which we
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then compare to the data.
Thus the following parameters govern the distributions and the behavior of the
firms: µx the shape parameter of the distribution of price gaps, σx the scale parameter
of the distribution of price gaps, b̄ the intercept and k the slope of log revenue in
the menu cost expression, and χ the probability of zero adjustment costs. Together
we denote these parameters as Θ. In addition, we use the calibrations outlined in
Table B.1 (from Section 2.4) to generate both a distribution of revenue and the
losses associated with each price gap. We fix the bandwidth for non-parametrically
estimating the densities of the size of price changes at 0.025.
We estimate the parameters Θ to minimize the difference in the average frequency
and price change distributions of each decile. We minimize the loss function:
















The first term is the sum across deciles of revenue of differences between the frequency
of price change in the simulation and the data. The second term is the of sum the
square of the differences between the density within each decile of revenue evaluated
at each of the grid points. Each summand is weighted by the empirical density at
that grid point, this is to ensure that the parts of the distribution that are most
frequently seen are given higher weight. The two terms are weighted by a fixed
W = 0.01 which gives most of the weight to the average frequency term.
In order to generate the simulated price changes, we randomly draw revenue
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and price gaps from Lognormal and Gamma distributions respectively, for 1,000,000
simulated firms. After each draw, the firms immediately adjust their price (close
their price gap) with probability χ. For every firm not changing from this shock, we
compare the menu cost to the loss from the sub-optimal price and adjust when the
loss from suboptimal pricing is larger. We compute by decile of revenue the average
frequency of price change: ˆ̄freq(Θ)d and the distribution of observed price gaps in
each decile f̂pcd (·; Θ). This simulation gives us a distribution of price changes for each
set of parameters Θ. We search across values of Θ to find the minimizer of L(Θ).
We present the estimated parameters in Table B.2. We find evidence that the
menu cost is sub-linear in revenue (k = 0.301); that is that the menu cost grows less
than one-to-one with revenue. Additionally, we find that the probability of zero menu
cost is 1.27%. Together with χ and k, we estimate scale and shape parameters of the
Gamma distribution as well as b̄. While these parameters are useful in evaluating
the model, we do not use them in the main model section of this paper. First,
the scale and shape parameters are redundant as the main model generates price
gap distributions from dynamic choices. Secondly, b̄ is closely tied to the average
frequency of price changes; we allow the main model to be disciplined directly by
that moment.
In Figure B.1 we show the distribution of the price gaps generated from the model
compared to the data. In Figure B.2, we compare the distribution of observed price
changes generated by the model compared to the data. We fit the shape of the
relationship between revenue and frequency of price changes relatively closely and
the distribution of price gaps at each decile of revenue less well, while still capturing
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the general relationship with revenue apparent in the data.
Overall, we make a serious effort to estimate the parameters of the menu cost
function and take the results as inputs to the quantitative parts of this paper. How-
ever, we do not claim they are authoritative, and future work may be warranted. We
believe that we are the first to propose estimating this relationship between menu
costs and revenue.
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Table B.1: Calibrated parameters for the estimation the menu cost function
parameter value
µrev 0 Mean parameter of the normal for revenue
σrev 1.3 Variance parameter of the normal for revenue
ε -3 Price elasticity
bw .025 Bandwidth for size of change
Table B.2: Estimation results
parameter value
k 0.301 menu cost exponent
b̄ 0.00727 menu cost level-shifter
χ 0.0127 probability of free change
µx 0.108 Shape parameter of the Gamma for price gaps
σx 0.102 Scale parameter of the Gamma for price gaps
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Figure B.1: Frequency of price change by decile of residualized revenue
Note: This figure shows the fit of the estimated menu cost model. The deciles are con-
structed from residual revenue. Blue dots represent the simulated results from the model
and the orange x represents the data.
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Figure B.2: Distribution of price changes by decile of revenue
Notes: This figure shows the fit of the estimated distribution of observed price gaps.
Deciles for the date are defined using residual revenue. Simulated model is described
in text. Blue dots represent the simulated results from the model and the orange x
represents the data.
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Figure B.2: Distribution of price changes by decile of revenue (continued)
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Figure B.2: Distribution of price changes by decile of revenue (continued)
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Markets and Product Categories
We choose 32 markets on which we conduct our analysis. The designated market
areas are defined by The Nielsen Company and correspond approximately (although
not exactly) to a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). The full list is provided in
Table B.3.
Table B.3: Designated Market Areas
DMA Name
Portland-Auburn ME Chicago IL
New York NY St Louis MO
Philadelphia PA Minneapolis-St Paul MN
Detroit MI Kansas City MO-KS
Boston (Manchester) MA-NH Oklahoma City OK
Ft Wayne IN Nashville TN
Cleveland OH Wichita-Hutchinson Plus KS
Washington DC (Hagerstown MD) Des Moines-Ames IA
Baltimore MD Little Rock-Pine Bluff AR
Cincinnati OH Denver CO
Charleston SC Phoenix AZ
Atlanta GA Boise ID
Indianapolis IN Albuquerque-Santa Fe NM
Louisville KY Los Angeles CA
Hartford & New Haven CT San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose CA
Tampa-St Petersburg (Sarasota) FL Seattle-Tacoma WA
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Table B.4: Product categories
Product Description
Pie & Pastry Filling - Canned Beer
Canned Fruit - Oranges Near Beer/Malt Beverage
Canned Fruit - Peaches - Freestone Gin
Gravy - Canned Vodka
Seafood-Crab-Canned Wine-Sangria
Seafood - Sardines - Canned Wine-Sweet Dessert-Imported
Seafood-Tuna-Shelf Stable Cleaners-Metal
Cat Food - Wet Type Cleaners-Humidifiers/Vaporizers
Cat Food - Moist Type Cooker Steamer And Dehydrator Appliance
Dog & Cat Treats Air Purifier And Cleaner Appliance
Egg Mixes-Dry Nutritional Supplements
Crackers - Sprayed Butter Vitamins-B Complex W/C
Crackers - Oyster Manicuring Needs
Coffee - Soluble Hair Spray - Men’s
Coffee Substitutes Baby Care Products-Bath
In Table B.4 we provide the list of product categories used in our analysis. For
measuring the relationship between the distribution of revenue and the local unem-
ployment rate we increase our sample to include all product categories in the fol-
lowing (more broadly defined) product groups: Fruit - canned, Pet Food, Prepared
Food-Ready-To-Serve, Coffee, Condiments Gravies and Sauces, Crackers, Household




Table B.5: IRF : Coefficients
Periods Quantile 1 Quantile 2 Quantile 3 Quantile 4 Quantile 5
1 -0.0202 -0.2955 -0.1320 -0.7483 -0.4627
(0.1323) (0.2079) (0.1177) (0.1612) (0.3661)
2 0.0405 -0.3792 -0.2798 0.1718 0.4683
(0.0876) (0.1606) (0.1593) (0.1885) (0.4243)
3 0.0620 0.0891 -0.0283 -0.1108 -1.1589
(0.0875) (0.1097) (0.1372) (0.1862) (0.3980)
4 -0.0483 -0.0058 0.0996 -0.1068 0.0655
(0.1663) (0.2116) (0.2611) (0.4117) (0.7516)
5 -0.1752 -0.3605 -0.5151 -0.7124 -0.7886
(0.0609) (0.2337) (0.2355) (0.2889) (0.2000)
6 -0.0990 -0.0429 -0.0825 -0.2341 -0.1423
(0.1409) (0.1708) (0.2891) (0.2761) (0.2723)
7 -0.0499 0.0653 0.0836 0.2636 0.1036
(0.0859) (0.1011) (0.1066) (0.1183) (0.2906)
8 -0.1471 -0.2807 -0.3986 -0.4504 -0.9734
(0.1123) (0.1131) (0.1420) (0.1703) (0.2622)
9 -0.3042 -0.4306 -0.6312 -0.6321 -0.5639
(0.0901) (0.1119) (0.1410) (0.1391) (0.1595)
10 0.1740 0.3216 0.3538 0.4516 1.1247
(0.1218) (0.0754) (0.1448) (0.1994) (0.3090)
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Table B.5: IRF : Coefficients (continued)
Periods Quantile 1 Quantile 2 Quantile 3 Quantile 4 Quantile 5
11 -0.3126 -0.2816 -0.0799 -0.0761 0.1426
(0.0682) (0.1211) (0.2010) (0.2776) (0.3819)
12 0.0882 -0.1204 -0.6310 -0.8655 -1.9853
(0.0641) (0.0993) (0.1290) (0.1150) (0.3187)
13 -0.1698 -0.4187 -0.3803 0.0952 0.5728
(0.1123) (0.1174) (0.1953) (0.2301) (0.3264)
14 -0.1551 -0.1201 -0.2762 -0.3285 -0.3634
(0.0802) (0.1846) (0.2508) (0.3537) (0.3614)
15 0.3777 0.4958 0.5292 0.2521 -0.3171
(0.1374) (0.1852) (0.1668) (0.1693) (0.3139)
16 0.2552 0.3873 0.3010 0.3467 0.3793
(0.0868) (0.0994) (0.1614) (0.2276) (0.6243)
17 -0.3776 -0.4809 -0.3095 -0.0649 0.2847
(0.0887) (0.1345) (0.1589) (0.2102) (0.3227)
18 -0.0709 -0.2485 -0.1356 0.1220 -0.0350
(0.0728) (0.0956) (0.0844) (0.1095) (0.1726)
Note: The dependent variable is the change in average change in log price within each
quantile for each month. The quantiles are defined by market month. The coefficient
reported is the appropriate lag of the monetary policy shocks from Paul (2018) except
for 2008-2009 where we add the surprise announcements documented by Gorodnichenko
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Figure B.3: Cumulative price response to a monetary shock by revenue quantile
(excluding unscheduled meetings)
Note: This figure shows the cumulative impulse response of prices by revenue quantile, to
an unexpected increase in the federal funds rate during a 30 minute window around FOMC
announcements. Quantile 1 represents products with the lowest revenue and Quantile 5
represents those with the highest revenue. The dashed red lines represent one standard
deviations confidence intervals. The dashed blue lines represent 90% confidence intervals.
163
Table B.6: IRF : Coefficients (excluding unscheduled meetings)
1 0.1492 -0.0281 -0.1278 -0.6805 -0.6177
(0.3406) (0.4239) (0.4450) (0.7159) (1.9262)
2 0.1729 -0.6066 -0.7004 0.8610 2.4103
(0.2040) (0.3857) (0.4306) (0.6939) (1.2548)
3 -0.0463 0.3950 0.0297 -0.1282 -1.1337
(0.2845) (0.3951) (0.3680) (0.4388) (0.8108)
4 0.2593 -0.1938 0.1729 -0.3597 -1.1746
(0.4517) (1.0428) (1.2558) (1.6809) (2.9283)
5 -0.1454 -0.4796 -0.3087 -1.1391 -1.8662
(0.1942) (0.8840) (0.7911) (1.2015) (0.9781)
6 -0.0263 -0.2640 0.2659 0.3099 0.5587
(0.2498) (0.3059) (0.4269) (0.4520) (0.6768)
7 -0.1747 -0.2213 0.0117 0.3723 -0.1466
(0.4011) (0.5390) (0.5192) (0.4384) (0.9236)
8 -0.0429 -0.4348 -0.4856 -1.0034 -1.6106
(0.5821) (0.4280) (0.5202) (0.6158) (0.9637)
9 -0.3108 -0.6335 -1.3043 -1.7526 -1.5293
(0.3351) (0.4471) (0.5936) (0.3037) (0.7574)
10 -0.0349 0.3331 -0.0109 0.2513 1.6594
(0.2966) (0.2774) (0.4761) (0.6656) (1.1321)
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Table B.6: IRF : Coefficients (continued)
11 -0.5036 -0.1082 0.1960 0.7598 0.8543
(0.3346) (0.4020) (0.6954) (1.1036) (1.4936)
12 0.1394 -0.3106 -1.1910 -1.4992 -3.0020
(0.2397) (0.3015) (0.3594) (0.4035) (0.9655)
13 -0.8877 -1.1802 -1.1352 -0.7750 -0.9191
(0.2098) (0.2601) (0.3892) (0.4404) (1.6616)
14 -0.2619 -0.3307 -0.6194 -0.8951 -0.4740
(0.2762) (0.4981) (0.7075) (0.9665) (1.3010)
15 0.2633 0.1999 0.5185 0.3053 0.2661
(0.3132) (0.4335) (0.4066) (0.5322) (0.7657)
16 0.6484 0.3009 -0.1964 -0.2436 -0.5395
(0.2893) (0.3398) (0.5788) (0.8998) (2.3806)
17 -0.7116 -1.2152 -1.2177 -0.7907 -0.2388
(0.3072) (0.4478) (0.4826) (0.6034) (1.2567)
18 -0.1728 -0.2994 -0.2026 0.0736 -0.7601
(0.1740) (0.3519) (0.2174) (0.4770) (0.4244)
Note: Note: The dependent variable is the change in average change in log price within
each quantile for each month. The quantiles are defined by market month. The coeffi-
cient reported is the appropriate lag of the monetary policy shocks from Paul (2018). All
standard errors are Newey-West with up to 12 lags.
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Table B.7: Revenue distribution over the business cycle: 30 product categories
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Median Std deviation Spread
unemployment -0.921 -0.994 -0.332 -1.023
(0.294) (0.340) (0.159) (0.312)
Observations 141,121 141,121 140,482 141,121
R-squared 0.805 0.785 0.698 0.698
Note: This table includes data from 30 product categories used in the main analysis of this
paper. The dependent variables are the moments of the log product revenue distribution
across retailers for a given UPC-market-month. The independent variable of interest is the
unemployment rate for a given market, computed from county level unemployment. All
regressions include fixed effects for market, month, and product category. Standard errors
clustered on market, month, and product category separately.
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Average Frequency of Price Change over the Business Cycle
In this section we document the correlation between the average frequency of price
change across all products with the business cycle. In Table B.8, we present regres-
sions of the average frequency of price change computed using a revenue weighted
average across the products in our main data. We regress these values on the national
unemployment rate, the growth rate of Industrial Production, the cyclical compo-
nent of HP-filtered Industrial production using (λ = 129600), and NBER recession
dummies. As in Vavra (2014) and Bachmann et al. (2019) we find that the average
frequency of price change is counter-cyclical in our sample.
In Table B.9 we present the same regressions except using a 6 month moving
average of the frequency of price change on the left hand side. The relationship ap-
pears stronger with smoothed values, perhaps suggesting that the averaging removes
noise. The Newey-West standard errors account for the extra auto-correlation that
averaging may induce.
In Table B.10 we present correlations between the average frequency of price ad-
justment with the industrial production variables. Again, we find a negative correla-
tion between average frequency of adjustment and the business cycle. Furthermore
these results, which are directly comparable to those in Table 1 of Vavra (2014), are
of similar magnitude as Vavra’s values obtained from the broader CPI data. We
therefore use the values in Tables B.8 and B.9 to calibrate the relationship between
average frequency of adjustment and output in our quantitative model.
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Table B.8: Regressions of average frequency of price change on business cycle mea-
sures









Observations 118 118 118 118
R-squared 0.010 0.00 0.01 0.049
Note: Dependent variable is the average frequency of price change weighted by the revenue
of each product. Unemployment rate is the seasonally adjusted national unemployment
rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. IP cycle is the cyclical component of industrial
production from an HP filter. IP growth is the month on month growth rate of industrial
production. NBER dummy are the recessions dates determined by the NBER. Standard
errors are computed using Newey-West with a max lag of 12.
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Table B.9: Regressions of average frequency of price change on business cycle mea-
sures (smoothed)









Observations 118 118 118 118
R-squared 0.130 0.055 0.053 0.238
Note: Dependent variable is the smoothed (ma-6) average frequency of price change
weighted by the revenue of each product. Unemployment rate is the seasonally adjusted
national unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. IP cycle is the cyclical
component of industrial production from an HP filter. IP growth is the month on month
growth rate of industrial production. NBER dummy are the recessions dates determined
by the NBER. Standard errors are computed using Newey-West with a max lag of 12.
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Table B.10: Correlation of Business Cycle with Avg. Freq.
Average Frequency Average Frequency (Smoothed)
IP Cycle -0.0633 -0.2393
IP Growth -0.0774 -0.2297
Note: We report simple correlation coefficients between average frequency of price ad-
justment and the business cycle. Frequency is computed as the revenue-weighed average
frequency of adjustment across products. Smoothed is the moving average (ma-6) frequency
of price adjustment. Unemployment rate is the seasonally adjusted national unemployment
rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. IP cycle is the cyclical component of industrial
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